Information Aggregation in Experimental Asset Markets: Traps and Misaligned Beliefs by Plott, Charles R. et al.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
INFORMATION AGGREGATION IN EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS:
TRAPS AND MISALIGNED BELIEFS
Markus Noeth
Colin F. Camerer
Charles R. Plott
Martin Webber
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1060
April 1999
Information Aggregation in Experimental Asset Markets:
Traps and Misaligned Beliefs

Markus Noth
a;b
, Colin F. Camerer
c
, Charles R. Plott
c
, and Martin Weber
b
12. April 1999
Abstract
The capacity of markets to aggregate information has been conclusively demonstrated but the limita-
tions of that capacity have still not been fully explored. In this paper, we demonstrate the existence
of \information traps". These traps appear to be a sort of equilibrium in which information existing
in the market does not become revealed in prices. The foundation for the equilibrium is a pattern
of misaligned beliefs in which each person's actions are based upon mistaken beliefs about the infor-
mation held by others. The mistakes, themselves, have a type of mutual compatibility and cannot
become revealed by the price discovery process because individuals have no incentives or resources
to adjust. Attempts to probe the nature of the phenomena involved two period markets with a
contingent claim instrument, experienced participants, and unlimited short selling opportunities.
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Consider the following situation in which three pieces of information exist in a market: Some participants
know the short term payment of a stock, i.e. the next quarter's dividend. The other participants have
partial information on the future stock price in six months. For example, some have perfect information
that the stock price will not drop below the current level and others know that the stock price will not
be at the current level. The combination of their information result in a perfect forecast of this stock
price, i.e. the stock price will go up.
1
Asset markets like the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ
are believed to aggregate this type of distributed information quite well, if not perfectly. Moreover,
the capacity of (experimental) markets to aggregate information has been conclusively demonstrated
although the limitations of that capacity have still not been fully explored.
In this paper, however, we report on the discovery of a special type of phenomenon (information trap)
that can exist in markets with asymmetric information of the type described above. These traps appear
to be a sort of equilibrium in which information existing in the market does not become revealed in prices.
The foundation for the equilibrium is a pattern of misaligned beliefs in which each person's actions are
based upon mistaken beliefs about the information held by others. The mistakes, themselves, have a
type of mutual compatibility and thus cannot become revealed by the price discovery process.
The nature of information aggregation in experimental markets is of interest for two reasons. The rst
interest stems from an opportunity to extend a very powerful theory, i.e. Rational Expectations. The
information structure, i.e. the amount and the specic distribution of information, is known at every
second within an experiment. Therefore, it is possible to explore dimensions of theories in ner detail
than one can do using naturally-occurring data. As a result, it is possible for us to document unusual
patterns that can only be guessed at using naturally-occurring data. For example, one of our main
contributions is to establish that in some periods, feedback from prices leads to information traps in
which one group of traders ends up believing that the assets have a value which another group of traders
knows cannot possibly be the true value. This may strike some readers as impossible, but keep in
mind that our experiments enable us to see patterns in beliefs and prices that are usually not visible
in naturally-occurring markets. It may be that these sorts of conicting beliefs are very common in
naturally-occurring markets, but usual sources of data disguise their existence. Experiments therefore
provide a kind of x-ray or special insight into detailed microstructure which, of course, should be used
to form conjectures that can be later tested using naturally-occurring data. In addition, one can vary
the specic variables in order to isolate certain factors which might inuence the process of information
aggregation.
Experiments are a legitimate test of general theories like the ecient markets hypothesis because those
theories should apply to simple, articially-created markets (like those in this experiment). That is, such
theories do not explicitly exclude experimental tests as an area of application. According to the general
theory, the phenomena we report should not occur in any market, so the rst step is to document their
existence. The second step is to help the theorists by attempting to isolate both the mechanism that
1
This scenario includes various assumptions. For example, all participants know that their private information is always
correct and the complete payment structure is common knowledge. However, this very simple example is sucient to
understand the intuition of our experimental design.
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seems to bring it about and by developing measurements and indicators that might help with a search to
determine if it can be detected in the more complex, naturally-occurring markets. The growing literature
on the possible impact of individual mistakes in assessing private information
2
demonstrates the necessity
of paying more attention to the process of information aggregation. In addition, our data put the burden
of proof on those who have faith in the general hypothesis to explain why the same phenomena would
not occur in naturally-occurring markets. Critics who think experiments are unrealistic or unfair tests of
general hypotheses should articulate the conditions under which experiments would represent fair tests.
The second source of interest stems from a long history in experimental economics, investigating whether
or not the information held by the insiders will necessarily emerge from the market activity and be
reected in the market prices. Although information aggregation could be observed in general there are
several diculties which might prevent or slow down information aggregation. Information aggregation
within one period could be observed in the experiment of Plott and Sunder (1982) with dividend payments
dependent on two states and three trader types which diered only on the paid dividends associated with
the states. However, extending this design to three states ruined the aggregation. Plott and Sunder
(1988) demonstrated that a complete set of Arrow/Debreu securities helped to achieve aggregation in
this setting. Aggregation also occurred with three possible states and common dividends even without
these securities. Copeland and Friedman (1987, 1991, 1992) analyzed the impact of information arrival
within one period. They found that it takes the market some time to partially aggregate the newly
arrived information.
Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1982) studied information aggregation in markets in which securities with
a two-period life were traded. Each participant knew at the beginning of a two-period market how much
money she would earn without trading. But since there existed two dierent trader types who received
dierent dividends at the end of both periods, subjects had an incentive to trade to earn more money.
In this experiment, information aggregation was observable, too. O'Brien and Srivastava (1991) used a
fairly complicated design with three or even four independent securities traded at the same time over two
periods. In addition, they tested the limits of information aggregation even more by introducing up to six
possible states. In most cases, these markets were not able to aggregate this very complex information.
Forsythe and Lundholm (1991) found that both trading experience and common knowledge of dividends
were only jointly sucient to achieve a RE equilibrium.
3
Although these results suggest that information aggregation in simple markets is possible, there are
indications that market participants are not always able to infer others' information via market prices.
Information aggregation consists of the correct reection of all available information, i.e. aggregation is
not achieved if information is either not completely or not correctly reected in prices. For example,
Camerer and Weigelt (1991) show that even in situations without any information, trading patterns are
sometimes similar to those with private information just because some investors believe that others have
private information. Thus, it is not necessary that some investors have private information to move asset
2
See for example Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998.
3
Schnitzlein (1996), Lamoureux and Schnitzlein (1997), Bloomeld (1996) as well as Bloomeld and O'Hara (1998, 1999)
use a dierent market structure and a dierent information structure to evaluate market micro structure models.
2
prices. In addition, Sunder (1992) reports that with just one to three traders price converge to the wrong
price, i.e. \prices were close to the F[ull] R[evelation] price for state x when, in fact, the realized state
was y" (p. 690). Forsythe and Lundholm (1991) nd convergence to the price and allocation of a wrong
state, too. They describe the specic reasoning of all traders after an individual \mistake" of trader
11 in period 9. The information of the \Not Y"-informed participants never became incorporated in
prices since they had an incentive to sell as many securities as possible at inated prices. As a result,
prices and allocations converged to the \Y"-state scenario (see p. 339). In those cases in which the
number of insiders were uncertain, Noth and Weber (1996) found trading patterns which are similar to
the information mirages. In addition, a monopolistic insider tried to manipulate the market by trading
against her private information for some time before she attempted to oset her losses later. This behavior
was not protable but demonstrated the possibility that individual behavior might destroy information
aggregation.
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1991) even showed that noise traders without any strategic
considerations can survive under certain circumstances because of the risk they create for \rational"
traders and the resulting risk premium. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) explain many
\anomalous" stock price movements by introducing overcondent market participants who underesti-
mate the variance of their individual signal. These two papers demonstrate that robust psychological
ndings can be incorporated into nancial theory to understand stock price movements and the process
of information aggregation.
4
The growing literature on (rational) herd behavior
5
shows that even with fully rational agents or traders
aggregation might not be achieved. In these models prices and/or allocations deviate from the RE
equilibrium because agents base their individual decisions not only on their own private information but
also on the observed behavior of other agents. Under special circumstances this fully rational behavior
leads to a situation in which agents neglect completely their private information and follow the crowd.
The result is an inecient allocation of resources and mispricing. Notice, that the inecient outcome is
not the result of false assumptions about the knowledge and beliefs of traders who acted earlier concerning
their information. In these models herd behavior results because of the specic information structure
and incentives for the agents. And the exogenous ordering of decisions can contribute to the ineciency,
as Gul and Lundholm (1995) point out. They demonstrate that clustered decisions are not necessarily an
indicator of herd behavior. Instead, clustering can be the result of endogenous timing of agents' (rational)
decisions using all available information. Moreover, Gul and Lundholm show that endogenous timing,
i.e. the choice to act rst or wait until other agents act, conveys information and thus has an inuence
on information aggregation.
Summing up, markets do indeed have the capacity to aggregate information. However, such capacity is
not perfect and neither the circumstances under which the aggregation might occur nor the processes that
4
Hong and Stein (1999) have two types of traders in their model which do not use all available information and which
are restricted to implement only simple strategies by assumption. As a result the existence of over- and underreaction can
be explained.
5
See for example Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and
Welch (1992) as early examples, as well as Anderson and Holt (1997) for the rst experimental study of information cascades.
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lead to the aggregation are well known. It is known however that the existence of special and additional
certicates, such as a complete set of Arrow/Debreu securities as used by Plott and Sunder (1988), add
substantial power to the process of information aggregation.
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The research reported here began with a project that extended the traditional investigations to cases
with an increased number of states and a more complex time dimension. In our experiment the common
value dividend design with three possible states of Plott and Sunder (1988) is combined with the two-
period information aggregation feature studied by Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1982) resulting in six
possible states in the rst period and a replication of Plott and Sunder (1988) in the second period.
This information structure captures a situation in which some investors know the next quarter's dividend
with certainty whereas other investors can only rule out whether the stock price will rise, fall or stay
at the current level within the next year. Initially, this research project was designed to explore the
consequences of dierent incentives on information aggregation. The misaligned beliefs and information
trap phenomena, documented and reported here, were discovered very early in the research program and
resulted in a need to explore its nature before going further to manipulate the individuals' acquisition of
information before trading starts by adding specic incentives.
In order to analyze these phenomena, it is necessary to have at least two dividend payments (= two
trading periods) for several reasons. First of all, this design allows us to ask subjects twice about
their beliefs just before the dividend is announced and compare both results contingent on the rst
period dividend, i.e. to observe the updating process in addition to transaction prices. Secondly, the
design incorporates a second-period benchmark by using the Plott and Sunder (1988) common dividend
design. If information is not aggregated in the second period the dynamics of the rst period will be
accountable for the formation of misaligned beliefs and information traps. Thirdly, in a two-period design
traders might believe that they can unwind their position before the liquidation value is paid and receive
payments (=dividends) for holding the asset which leads to speculation.
7
Information traps are an example of the self-conrming equilibrium introduced by Fudenberg and Levine
(1993a) in game theory. In our experiment some participants know that observed prices cannot be
the equilibrium price since they can rule this but by using their private information. However, these
information traps are (mostly)
8
stable because those participants who know that observed price are not
correct have no incentive (assuming risk neutrality) to convince the market to move in another direction.
In this paper we ask three questions:
1. Can the existence of misaligned beliefs and information traps be detected and documented;
2. Is the existence of these phenomena robust to certain kinds of institutional changes;
6
Sunder (1995) and Duxbury (1995) provide summaries of the literature about experimental asset markets.
7
The bubble experiments run by Porter and Smith (1994) demonstrated that speculation can cause bubbles even with
perfect knowledge about future payments.
8
In two cases with experienced subjects information traps collapsed because some participants obviously suspected the
existence of a trap and tried to sell their assets resulting in a crash.
4
3. What market dynamics bring these phenomena into existence.
Of course, one would like to know if the phenomena occurs frequently but it is too early to pose that
type of question. This paper is conned to the study of simple experimental markets. Information
aggregation and the convergence towards the RE equilibrium is observable. However, information traps
due to traders' misaligned beliefs occur frequently in our special setting. Although common dividends
are paid, the existence of traps is still observable even with experienced traders. The introduction of an
additional state contingent claim market helps to avoid information traps but non revealing equilibria
still exist.
9
Traps develop on a combination of individual misbehavior such as plunging or scalping as
well as eliminating the correct state on the basis of prices and private information.
We proceed with the experimental design and procedures. In section 2 we will present information
aggregation theory for this experiment as well as a denition of both, misaligned beliefs and informa-
tion traps. Section 3 contains the main results. Some explanations and theoretical speculation about
the development of information traps are discussed in section 4. The nal section 5 is a summary of
conclusions.
1. Experimental Design and Procedures
1.1 General Design
This experimental series consists of fourteen sessions. The rst eight took place at the California Institute
of Technology and the last six were conducted at the Universitat Mannheim.
10
All of the following
parameters were fully known by all participants since they were part of the instructions (see Appendix
A). Each participant within one session received the same number of identical `regular' certicates at
the beginning of a trading year. These certicates have a two period (=one year) life and will pay a
common dividend in both periods which last seven minutes each. The dividend paid in period A will
be determined by a random choice of states H
A
and L
A

p
A
=
1
2

and the dividend in period B will be
determined independently by a random choice of states H
B
;M
B
, and L
B

p
B
=
1
3

.
Figure 1 shows that the dividend is 100 currency units (cu) higher in period A if state H
A
occurs. In
period B the dividend will be 400 (200) cu higher at state H
B
; (M
B
) than if state L
B
occurs.
11
In some sessions there are additional H
B
-certicates which will pay a common dividend of 100 cu only
at the end of period B if state H
B
occurs and 0 cu otherwise. However, it is possible to trade these
H
B
-certicates in a second market throughout the whole trading year. The markets are organized as a
computerized multiple unit double auction resembling a continuous market.
12
9
A related paper by Plott, Wit and Yang (1997) supports the notion that other market structures, e.g. a betting market,
have an important or even decisive impact on the capability of markets to aggregate dispersed information.
10
We translated the set of instructions to make sure that the language did not cause dierent behavior in Germany.
11
We had to change the L
A
and L
B
dividends since we used the time series of draws more than once to compare the price
process across sessions.
12
For a detailed description of the Multiple Unit Double Auction (MUDA) software, see Plott (1991).
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Figure 1: Dividend structure
Assets in this experimental market have a two-period life. After period A assets pay a dividend of either L
A
orH
A
= L
A
+100.
At the end of period b the liquidation value is with probability p =
1
3
either high (H
B
= L
B
+400), medium (M
B
= L
B
+200)
or low (L
B
). All payments are in currency units which are converted into US$ or DM at the end of the experiment.
H A = L A + 1 0 0
L A
p A
=
1
2
H B = L B + 4 0 0
L B
p B
=
1
3
M B = L B + 2 0 0
P e r i o d  A P e r i o d  B
At the beginning of every year each subject gets ten regular certicates and ten H
B
-certicates if they
exist.
13
The inventory of certicates and cash is carried over from period A to period B. Subjects receive
no cash endowment but there is no restriction on lending money, which has to be paid back with no
interest at the end of each year. In addition, subjects must pay the minimum dividend (L
A
+ L
B
) for
each regular certicate. Except for sessions 9512111, 9512112 and 9512121 participants are not allowed
to sell certicates short. Table 1 summarizes the relevant parameters for all sessions.
1.2 Information Structure
The states are drawn and are known to the experimenter before any market periods are started. Before
the opening of a market period A, information is randomly distributed to all participants, i.e. information
about the state in period A and period B is distributed before the market opens for period A. One third
of the participants are given complete private information about the dividend that will be paid at the
end of period A. The remaining two thirds of the subjects who do not have private information about the
period A dividend receive information about the states that will NOT occur in period B.
14
Since half of
the period B informed participants will be able to eliminate one state and the other half can eliminnate
the other, collectively their private information would allow them to identify with certainty the period B
dividend that will be paid.
Subjects know that all private information is correct in all cases. Note that four (in sessions with twelve
traders) or ve (fteen traders) participants receive the same information and have no opportunity to
communicate with each other except via limit or market orders. Thus, they cannot cooperate and act
strategically to hide their information etc. Moreover, subjects cannot choose whether they would like
to get information about period A or period B because they have to draw an information card out of a
box.
15
13
In session 9510281 subjects receive just ve regular certicates.
14
Foster and Viswanathan (1996) demonstrate with their model that the information structure, i.e. the intial correlation
among the informed traders' signal, has a signicant eect on the informed traders' prots and the information conten of
prices.
15
This procedure makes sure that subjects cannot specialize on any specic type of information.
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Table 1: Design: Main Parameters
In this table the most important parameters are displayed for each session of this experiment. The sessions took place
either at the California Institute of Technology or at UniversitatMannheim. The next column shows the number of traders
(no. T). Traders were either inexperienced (exp.= no) or they participated once before in the same experimental setting
(exp.= yes). The number of trading years in which dividends could be earned is displayed in the next column (no. Y). The
common dividend payment (in currency units) is shown for each certicate depending on the state in period A and B. # C
and #H
B
are initial endowments (per subject) of regular certicates and H
B
-claims, respectively. Short selling restrictions
(yes / no) existed in most sessions. Except for one session (9510281), participants had to place one of two bets on the RE
price (*: in session (9511041) existed just one bet).
Period A Period B Certicates
Session Place # P exp. # Y H
A
L
A
H
B
M
B
L
B
# C # H
B
Short Bets
9510281 C 12 no 9 200 100 500 300 100 5 NA no no
9511041 C 12 no 9 300 200 600 400 200 10 NA no yes*
9511091 C 15 no 8 300 200 600 400 200 10 NA no yes
9511141 C 15 no 8 300 200 500 300 100 10 NA no yes
9511161 C 15 no 8 200 100 600 400 200 10 NA no yes
9511261 C 15 yes 10 200 100 600 400 200 10 NA no yes
9511271 C 15 yes 10 200 100 600 400 200 10 NA no yes
9511281 C 15 no 8 200 100 600 400 200 10 10 no yes
9512111 M 10 no 9 200 100 400 NA 100 10 NA yes yes
9512112 M 10 no 9 200 100 400 NA 100 10 NA yes yes
9512121 M 12 no 8 200 100 500 300 100 10 NA yes yes
9512131 M 12 no 8 300 200 600 400 200 10 NA no yes
9512141 M 12 no 7 200 100 600 400 200 10 NA no yes
9512151 M 12 no 7 200 100 500 300 100 10 NA no yes
The following example will clarify the information structure: If state H
A
L
B
occurs one third of the
participants receive private information before the period A market(s) open that state H
A
will occur and
thus they will receive the dividend H
A
= L
A
+ 100cu. Another third of the traders knows from their
private information that they will not get the state H
B
dividend (H
B
= L
B
+ 400cu) at the end of period
B. The remaining third of the participants can exclude stateM
B
for period B. As a result, all participants
together (=the market) know at the beginning of period A that the state is H
A
L
B
. Accordingly, the
value of the `regular' certicate in period A is equal to the sum of dividends D
H
A
and D
L
B
and it is equal
to dividend L
B
in period B.
16
Figure 2 claries the information structure for this example. Note that
there is only one Rational Expectations Equilibrium but three cases in which two of the three information
groups can agree on a state, i.e. H
A
H
B
(H
A
andNOTM
B
informed groups), H
A
M
B
(H
A
; NOTH
B
) and
L
A
L
B
(NOTH
B
; NOTM
B
).
16
Plott, Wit and Yang (1997) used the same information structure as in this experiment but paid a dividend which
depended on the total betting amount.
7
Figure 2: Information structure: state = H
A
L
B
For each state combination exists a well-dened equilibrium based on the combination of dividend payment and liquidation
value. Note, that the potential equilibrium prices are at least 100cu apart to ensure a clear distinction between dierent
state combinations. The combination of all available information always implies only one state combination.
H A H B
L A H B
H A M B
L A L B
L A M B
H A L B
D i v i d e n dS t a t e
9 0 0
5 0 0
6 0 0
7 0 0
8 0 0
4 0 0
I n f o r m a t i o n  ( S t a t e  =  H A L B )
P e r i o d  A P e r i o d  B
H A
L A
H B
M B
L B
H A H B
L A H B
H A M B
L A L B
L A M B
H A L B
p o s s i b l e  s t a t e i m p o s s i b l e  s t a t e
R a t i o n a l  E x p e c t a t i o n s
H A N o t  H B N o t  M B
There are some dierences in sessions 9512111 and 9512112 in which only state H
B
or L
B
can occur in
period B (dividend dierence 300cu). Participants receive either information on the state of period A
or on that of period B, i.e. some subjects know exactly the dividend of period B. After year 4 subjects
can choose whether they would like to receive information on period A or on period B. The number of
participants who chose A is announced at the end of period B. These two sessions serve as a benchmark
for the other sessions since the information and dividend structure is simpler: Information aggregation
is achieved even in the rst trading year.
1.3 Bets on the Dividends
Transaction prices typically reect the average opinion of all market participants about the value of the
certicates. However, it is possible that some traders have a dierent opinion but they cannot or do not
want to trade. In addition, just one buyer and one seller participate in a specic trade and the other
traders are just observing the transaction price. Because we cannot infer traders' beliefs based only on
8
transaction prices, we asked all subjects at the end of each period to predict all future dividend(s) of the
`regular' certicates in this year, i.e. at the end of period A they predicted the sum of dividends for both
periods. The predictions are collected before the period's dividend is announced.
In order to get more reliable predictions, subjects have to place one of two possible bets on their prediction
(see Grether, 1992).
17
Choosing a specic bet reveals to some extent the certainty which is assigned
to the prediction. The bets are constructed as follows. Bet I will result in a payment of US$ h
1
(US$ l
1
) if the prediction is correct (wrong). Bet II is dened accordingly. Under the assumption of
risk neutrality a subject will be indierent between both bets if the probability p
i
of the predicted
state satises p
i
 h
1
+ (1  p
i
)  l
1
= p
i
 h
2
+ (1  p
i
)  l
2
: As a result, subjects will prefer bet I if
p
i
>
l
2
 l
1
(h
1
 l
1
)(h
2
 l
2
)
: Since we choose h
1
> h
2
and l
1
< l
2
subjects will prefer bet I over bet II if they have a
higher degree of certainty concerning their prediction. Note that we do not have any specic information
about individual's probability distribution since we only asked for a point estimate.
Let us assume that you are in one of the CalTech sessions at the end of period A and must predict the
sum of dividends for both, period A and period B. With information on the period A (B) dividend you
can rule out three (four) of the six possible states. Bet I will pay US$0.60 (US$-0.30) if your prediction is
correct (wrong). If you choose bet II you will receive US$ 0.30 with a correct prediction and you will lose
US$ -0.10 otherwise. As a result you will take bet II only if you assign to your prediction a probability of
being correct of at least 0.40. Choosing bet I at the end of period A signals that a participant is certain
of having at least two thirds of the available information. Table 7 (in Appendix B.) provides data about
the design of bets for all experiments.
18
After reading the instructions subjects get accustomed to the procedure (information distribution, trad-
ing, and betting on their own prediction) by participating in a trading year without getting paid. Figure
3 provides a time line illustrating all relevant aspects of the design and of conducting the experiment.
1.4 Subject Pools
In sessions at the California Institute of Technology twelve or fteen subjects participated whereas at
Universitat Mannheim just twelve students participated in a session. All 84 subjects at the California
Institute of Technology have prior experience with experiments because they are recruited by e-mail out
of a subject pool of former participants. Some subjects of sessions 1-5 participated again in sessions 6
and 7, i.e. they have experience in this specic experiment. The 68 subjects in Germany are primarily
recruited from graduate courses in banking and in nance. Those students who have never participated
before, receive a mandatory training lesson of about 45 minutes to learn how to handle the trading
software MUDA.
19
17
In session 1 no predictions are collected. In session 2 participants receive US$ 0.50 for a correct prediction and have to
pay US$ 0.25 otherwise.
18
In the sessions conducted in Mannheim we increased the p
i
value to obtain a clearer signal if a subject with an information
about the rst period chooses the high bet. For the two sessions with just two possible states in period B we had to adjust
the bets due to the information structure.
19
In these training sessions they get no information about the parameters of the real experiment.
9
Figure 3: Timeline of this experiment
In part a) of this gure the general timeline for this experiment is displayed. Part b) shows the specic procedure with one
of the trading years. Note that all information is distributed before trading in period A starts.
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2. Denitions, Models and Information Aggregation Process
Participants have an incentive to trade in this experiment since they receive private information at the
beginning of a trading year. The resulting dierences in expected values start the trading process as
participants adjust their positions. Then, trading continues as market participants update their beliefs.
In addition, the two period design opens some room for trade-based and information-based speculation.
For example, overcondent subjects overestimate the information they observe from transaction prices
and thus speculate (=bet) rather early on a specic state. NOTM
B
-informed participants who know
that certicates will either pay a high (H
B
) or a low (L
B
) period B dividend may be especially tempted
to bet early whether H
B
or L
B
will occur and thereby inuence prices and other traders' beliefs.
Observed transaction prices and beliefs will be compared to three benchmarks. Based on these compar-
isons we will be able to search for and analyze trading patterns which lead to systematic nonaggregation
which we will call information traps.
2.1 Rational Expectations
Under Rational Expectations all information will nally become incorporated in prices.
20
There is no
allocation prediction since everyone knows (at the end) which dividend(s) will be paid. Regardless of the
20
It is an experimentally well established result that it takes some time to reach an RE equilibrium. See for example
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990).
10
private information every trader received at the beginning there should exist a common belief about the
true state at the end of a trading period or year.
21
2.2 Random Choice Model (Private Information)
Our second benchmark concerning beliefs is based on each individual's private information. The prior or
private information (PI) model predicts that those traders with the highest expected value will hold all
certicates at the end of each period, e.g. NOTL
B
-informed will always buy all certicates up to their
expected value (period A: halfway between H
A
+M
B
and L
A
+H
B
; period B: halfway between M
B
and
H
B
) if states H
B
orM
B
occur. Traders cannot learn anything from transaction prices within this model.
The individual beliefs provide further evidence whether subjects have learned anything about others'
information. No learning would lead to a situation in which Period A informed subjects can rule out
three out of six possible states in period A with their private information and none of the three states in
period B. Period B informed participants can eliminate two states in period A and one state in period B.
Under the assumption that all subjects guess randomly based only on their private information (Random
Choice Model: RCM) we can derive a new benchmark distribution as demonstrated in table 2 for state
H
A
L
B
:
Table 2: State H
A
L
B
: Random Choice Model vs. Rational Expectations
The distribution of predictions for each information group in state H
A
L
B
is shown in this table based only on private
information. Assuming equal size of all information groups, the Random Choice Model (RCM) combines the random
guesses of all groups. Without any information in the market, the random distribution of predictions would look like those
in row no info. If all available information is aggregated (RE) all participants should predict the correct state H
A
L
B
.
Period A Period B
information H
A
H
B
H
A
M
B
H
A
L
B
L
A
H
B
L
A
M
B
L
A
L
B
H
B
M
B
L
B
H
A
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 0 0
1
3
1
3
1
3
NOTH
B
0
1
4
1
4
0
1
4
1
4
0
1
2
1
2
NOTM
B
1
4
0
1
4
1
4
0
1
4
1
2
0
1
2
RCM
7
36
7
36
10
36
3
36
3
36
6
36
5
18
5
18
8
18
no info
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
3
1
3
1
3
RE 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Since all information groups have the same number of members it is easy to compute the RCM value as
the mean of random guesses for each state. Notice the peaks of
10
36
and
8
18
at the correct state H
A
L
B
and
L
B
in period A and period B, respectively. In addition, table 2 displays the `no information value', i.e. the
proportion of random guesses without usage of any private information, and the distribution of guesses
21
Market participants' risk attitude might have an inuence on how close observed prices are to the fundamental value.
However, there is no reason why risk attitude should be state dependent and thus it will not inuence the outcome con-
siderably. In addition, previous experiments have shown that subjects are on average almost risk neutral in this type of
experiment.
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under the RE assumption. The aggregation of all guesses only provides a rst hint whether the available
information is aggregated by market participants or not. In order to dierentiate between systematic
and unsystematic nonaggregation of information we need a clear concept and measure to classify each
period's aggregation result.
2.3 Misaligned Beliefs
In this subsection we will introduce the concept of misaligned beliefs which is the basis for systematic
misaggregation, i.e. information traps. Misaligned beliefs are always the result of individual mistakes
interpreting private information or price movements (see section 2.6). Since traders cannot always observe
or detect these individual mistakes they interpret the noisy price signals as if they are based on fully
rational behavior. As a consequence (pseudo-rational) herd behavior and the development of misaligned
beliefs can inuence prices signicantly. In this context we dene misaligned beliefs:
Denition:Misaligned beliefs consist of a consensus within information groups and a systematic lack
of consensus between information groups.
Each trader can be classied by her private information as a member of a specic information group.
Within our design there are three information groups dened by the initial distribution of private informa-
tion. For example, if state H
A
L
B
occurs, the information groups I (H
A
), I (NOTH
B
) and I (NOTM
B
)
exist. If members of an information group have the same beliefs about the certicates' fundamental value
and these beliefs dier from each other we have a systematic lack of consensus. For example, at the
beginning of a trading year there is consensus within each information group but due to dierent private
information there is no consensus between the groups. This consensus which is in this experiment only
achievable at the REE can only be reached by updating based on either market transactions or based on
observable oers (bids & asks).
Note, that the denition of misaligned beliefs do not incorporate any dynamic feature of their evolution
and stability. Beliefs might change based on public information. Whether this change leads to dierent
misaligned beliefs or to the RE equilibrium depends on the interpretation of price movements. These
dierent interpretation can inuence for example the timing decisions by traders: Overcondent subjects
will choose to trade early based on their own private information and on their incorrect estimation of the
certicates' true value. Other traders who behave fully rational and who cannot dierentiate between
rational and \overcondent" prices now learn distorted information and thus form ex-ante correct but
ex-post incorrect beliefs. This process can stabilize or even increase the mispricing and lead again to
misaligned beliefs. As a result, prices cannot be at the RE equilibrium.
The general denition of Misaligned Beliefs can be stated more precisely using a special feature of
our design. The special denition eliminates all situations in which all three information groups have
dierent consensus beliefs. Instead we require that two information groups have a single consensus which
is dierent from that of the remaining group. Combined with the prediction of the most likely state
(combination), this implies that both newly formed groups know that the belief of the other group is not
possible based on the own private information. Take state H
A
L
B
again as an example. Suppose groups
I (H
A
) and II (NOTM
B
) have the consensus belief that state H
A
H
B
will occur and group III (NOTH
B
)
believes state H
A
M
B
will occur. It is obvious that both consensus beliefs are mutually inconsistent and
12
each group knows that the other consensus belief is wrong.
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This situation can only stabilize due to the
fact that beliefs are not publicly observable.
This leads to the special denition which will be used (and relaxed) for the analysis in section 3:
Denition:Misaligned beliefs consist of a systematic lack of consensus between two information groups
of which one group knows to be false what the other group thinks is true.
If one thinks of misalignment as dierences in probability judgments of states, this means that the
misalignments we observe are as large as statistically possible. In naturally-occurring settings these
misalignments might of course be smaller. Nevertheless, observations derived within our setting can be
used to evaluate more general situations as in naturally-occurring markets.
2.4 Mean Absolute Deviation of Beliefs
To test if participants' predictions are all in line with Rational Expectations is fairly easy by using a
binomial test. However, we would like to nd a measure to gain insight into the degree of deviation from
both, RE and RCM. The measure should take into account not only the correct and false predictions but
also the distribution of wrong predictions at the end of a period because this distribution may contain
additional information about information groups' degree of learning. A very simple measure is the mean
absolute deviation of beliefs which compares the relative frequencies of participants' predictions with
those of a benchmark model for all possible state predictions. For comparability, the mean absolute
deviation of beliefs (W
RE
) will always be computed compared to Rational Expectations:
W
RE
=
1
2

X
all states
jp
RE
  p
beliefs
j :
p
state
RE
denotes the probability with which this state should be predicted under the RE assumption. It is
equal to one for the correct state and zero otherwise. p
state
beliefs
denotes the actually observed frequency of
stated beliefs for this particular state within a specic group of subjects. The mean absolute deviation
of beliefs can be computed both, for all subjects as a general benchmark and for each group in order
to analyze information specic learning. Misalignment of beliefs result in deviations both from RE and
from RCM. Perfect misalignment leads to the maximum mean absolute deviation of beliefs of 1 for
each information group. The mean absolute deviation of beliefs for the RCM model compared to RE
is W
A
RE
 
RCM
all

=
1
2


7
36
+
7
36
+

1 
10
36

+
3
36
+
3
36
+
6
36

=
13
18
in period A and W
B
RE
 
RCM
all

=
1
2


5
18
+
5
18
+

1 
8
18

=
5
9
in period B.
Mean absolute deviation of beliefs bigger than the RCM value for an information group indicate unlearn-
ing of private information since we compute the mean absolute deviation of beliefs relative to RE.
23
22
Note that the crucial lack of consensus is the one between period B informed groups. It does not matter if period A
informed subjects do not have a consensus within their information group.
23
Theoretically, there exist several distribution which lead to the maximum mean absolute deviation of beliefs of 1 at
the end of period A. All these distributions have one feature in common namely no participant predicts the correct state
although this does not necessarily imply the existence of misaligned beliefs. However, at the end of period B the maximum
mean absolute deviation of beliefs for period B informed subjects is equivalent to perfect misalignment of beliefs.
13
An equilateral triangle whose sides are one unit long is best suited to represent graphically the mean
absolute deviation of beliefs and its' connection to prices in period B. The three states correspond to the
three corners. Since period B informed subjects can rule out one state the mean absolute deviation of
beliefsW
RE
lies on the straight line between the two possible states, i.e. if all subjects of one information
group predict the correct state (W
RE
= 0). Halfway between the correct and the wrong state lies the
RCM prediction

W
B
RE

RCM
NOTH
B
=NOTM
B

at 0.5 as can be seen in gure 4.
Figure 4: State (H
A
)L
B
: Triangle with mean absolute deviations of beliefs for RE, RCM and MAB
Based on the collected belief statements which include a state prediction and an associated bet on this prediction it is
possible to calculate the mean absolute deviation of beliefs for all three information groups. These distances are displayed
in this triangle for the beliefs of period B if state L
B
occurs.
H B
L B
M B
p r i c e
6 0 0
4 0 0
2 0 0
R a t i o n a l  E x p e c t a t i o n s
I n f o  = H A  o r  = L A
R a n d o m  C h o i c e  M o d e l  ( P r i v a t e  I n f o r m a t i o n )
N
O
T
 M
B
M i s a l i g n e d  B e l i e f s  ( T y p e  I )
M i s a l i g n e d  B e l i e f s  ( T y p e  I I )
A
A :
In this example for state (H
A
)L
B
the lled circle at the L
B
-corner corresponds to W
RE
= 0, i.e. the
RE prediction. The RCM predictions for each information group are plotted as circles. The period A
informed participants' RCM (denoted by A) prediction lies at the same distance from each of the three
corners at the center of the triangle. In principle it would be possible to put the computed mean absolute
deviation of beliefs for the period A information group on any point of a circle around the RE corner and
within the triangle. However, we can use data from the distribution of beliefs to specify exactly one point
within the triangle. The exact location within the triangle is determined by the mode of predictions.
The mark will be placed on the (solid) line from the center to the mode corner if a unique mode exists.
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If two modes exist the mark will be put on the (broken) line from the triangle's center to the middle of
two modes' side.
At this point we have to modify (slightly) the concept of correspondence between the mean absolute
deviation of beliefs and the distances within the triangle because the distance from a corner to the center
of the triangle is less than
2
3
of a side's length. However, the center of the triangle divide the (shortest)
straight line from each corner to the opposite side 2 to 1 which corresponds to the mean absolute deviation
of beliefs of W
B
RE

RCM
S=T

=
2
3
. Therefore, we have to adjust the distance in the gure accordingly.
In gure 4 two examples of misaligned beliefs are shown. The rst example denoted by small triangles
can be observed if transaction prices are around the dividend of state M
B
: H
A
and NOTH
B
informed
participants predict mostly state M
B
. The NOTM
B
informed who know that this prediction is not
correct bet on state H
B
which can be ruled out by the NOTH
B
informed. The second example denoted
by squares shows a situation in which H
A
and NOTM
B
informed predict state H
B
and the NOTH
B
informed choose their highest possible state, i.e. state M
B
. As a result prices can be expected to be closer
to the H
B
dividend than to the M
B
dividend.
24
2.5 Information Trap
Misaligned beliefs are not sucient to cause the evolution of an information trap. Otherwise, the mutually
inconsistent beliefs at the beginning of a trading year, which are due to dierent private information,
would never allow information aggregation. However, there are some incentives to trade since expected
values dier across information groups and since subjects may have dierent risk attitudes. In contrast,
in a market without dierences in participants' expected values and risk adjusted positions, trading and
bidding will cease at a point dierent from the RE equilibrium because no participant has an incentive to
trade. In addition, there can exist situation in which all traders with the same information cannot buy
or sell certicates because they have either no money to buy or certicates to sell.
25
As a result, these
traders' information is lost to the market and therefore other traders cannot learn that their current
expectation is not correct.
26
Denition: An information trap occurs if (i) beliefs are misaligned and (ii) traders have no incentive
to trade.
24
In principle, it is possible to establish a connection between a period's average transaction price and market participants'
average beliefs by projecting the triangle on the y-axis (parallel to the H
B
L
B
-line). However, we can oer no suitable
explanation about the exact relation between prices and beliefs which is beyond the scope of this paper.
25
In most sessions there existed only a short selling restriction. Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) showed that even a
nite number of trading opportunities does not rule out the existence of bubbles if each agent has private information and
faces a short sale constraint in the future with positive probability. Thus, we conducted some sessions without any short
selling restriction.
26
The dierence between our denition of information traps and the traps Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1982) tried to
construct in their experiment in session 4 is quite obvious at this point. They constructed a situation in which subjects
trading only based on their private information would have lead to no trading in period B and thus the period B information
would be lost to the market (p. 547f) resulting in a loss of welfare. In their simple setting, subjects avoided this particularly
designed trap. Notice, that information traps in our experiment are not articially induced and require a special type of
misaligned beliefs.
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Most riskless trades can be executed by either NOTH
B
or by NOTL
B
informed subjects since they can
reduce the range of possible dividend payments by 200 cu. Period A informed can reduce the range by
100 cu and NOTM
B
informed cannot rule out any extreme dividend payment. For example, NOTH
B
informed will sell certicates as long as they can receive more money than they would in state H
A
M
B
and
thereby holding the price down at this level as long as they have certicates left to sell. Once they are sold
out or they decide to sell no additional certicates because of paralysis they have reached an (eective)
boundary, i.e. these participants can do nothing which would cause other traders to change their beliefs,
making them aligned. As a result prices can go up to a level on which the remaining participants can
agree on since they do not recognize that one information group is forced to stay out of the market. It is
crucial at this point that NOTH
B
informed subjects have no other way communicating their information
than via market transactions.
2.6 Information Aggregation Process
In this section we show which specic aggregation process would lead to RE-prices in this experiment.
This exercise is necessary to understand why information might be aggregated in some situations whereas
nonaggregation can be observed in others. In section 4 we will identify specic types of behavior and
demonstrate their implications on the process of information aggregation. As noted in section 2.5 in-
formation NOTH
B
or NOTL
B
can be used to reduce the range of possible dividend payments by 200
cu and thus drive the price to the M
B
range. Period A information only helps to rule out one extreme
state (either L
A
L
B
or H
A
H
B
) and is therefore less valuable. Figure 5 shows the possible price impact of
private information in period A depending on the correct state in period B.
Figure 5: Price impact of private information
The potential price impact based on private information is displayed in this gures depending on the three possible states
in period B. For example, information H
A
leads to a slightly higher expected value than without any private information
in period A. Thus, if these participants use only their private information this will lead to higher prices than without any
information.
s t a t e  H B s t a t e  M B s t a t e  L B
N O T  H B
N O T  L B
H A
L A
N O T  M B
H B
L B
M B
H B H B
N O T  H B
M B M B
L B L B
H A H A
L A L A
N O T  L B
N O T  M B
Information aggregation should be achieved easily if state M
B
occurs because both NOTH
B
- and
NOTL
B
-informed traders will drive prices to the M
B
dividend range. Period A informed will then
16
be able to use their information to reach the RE equilibrium. However, if information NOTM
B
is avail-
able it will be crucial in which ordering price signals will reach the market. NOTH
B
or NOTL
B
are
the most important information in these situations because NOTM
B
-informed traders need this to de-
cide whether state L
B
or state H
B
will occur. Note that NOTM
B
-informed traders should wait until
they receive price signals to update their beliefs since certicates' expected value does not change based
exclusively on their own private information.
The problem is to distinguish between signals from period A informed and from the other period B
information group. Period A informed traders have to deal with the following dilemma: on one hand
they can only adjust slightly their expected value and hence their trading position and should wait until
period B information is relatively obvious but on the other hand their information is only valuable in
period A. As a result both, period A informed traders and NOTM
B
-informed traders have to nd a
balance between greed, i.e. speculating early based on fuzzy information, and fear, i.e. betting on the
wrong side of the market.
In general, information aggregation can be achieved if period B information is aggregated rst and then
adjusted by period A information. More specically, the most extreme information (NOTH
B
; NOTL
B
)
has to be incorporated into prices rst. Second, the remaining period B information should have its impact
on prices before nally period A information enter into the process. Information can be aggregated by
sequences of bids (to buy), asks (to sell) or by transactions. The interpretation of price changes and the
resulting updating process is the crucial part of the information aggregation process.
3. Results
This section starts with several general results and observations before specic and more detailed results
are discussed. Each session lasted between 2.5 and 3 hours. Subjects earned on average 35.59 US$ or
43.33 DM within a range of 5.00 US$ (-23.76 DM) to 78.16 US$ (86.13 DM) by collecting dividends.
27
In
addition, participants received between -2.80 US$ (-1.25 DM) and 5.10 US$ (5.00 DM) for their bets on
the true state or state combination. Taking all periods of all sessions (=236 periods) together our data
base consists of 10851 bids, 10313 asks, 11849 executed transactions and belief data of all traders and all
periods.
28
Figure 6 contains a typical trading picture for three years (year 4-6) within one session (9511271).
For every period the RE-price is displayed as a solid (horizontal) line. Diamonds, squares, and circles
denote asks, bids, and transactions, respectively. Obviously, some information is aggregated in both,
period A and period B but the aggregation is not always complete.
29
Average beliefs correspond directly
27
This payment numbers are computed separately for participants at CalTech and Universitat Mannheim and reect
dierences due to certain restrictions at both universities. In Mannheim, one participant had to pay 23.76 DM at the end
of the session. All other participants earned a positive amount of money.
28
In session 9510281 no belief data was collected and in session 9511041 subjects had no choice between two bets.
29
This is one of the best aggregation examples especially in year 4.
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Figure 6: Bids, asks and transactions: session 9511271, trading years 4, 5 and 6
For every period the RE-price is displayed as a solid (horizontal) line. Diamonds, squares, and circles denote asks, bids,
and transactions, respectively. In this session the dividend payment at the end of period A is 200cu if state L
B
occurs.
The lowest possible liquidation value (state L
B
) is 200cu, too. In trading year 4 the state H
A
L
B
occurs. As a result, the
fundamental value in period A is 400cu. In period B it is 200cu. In trading year 5 state H
A
H
B
implies a fundamental value
of 800cu and 600cu, respectively. The fundamental values in year 6 are 500 and 400 since state L
A
M
B
occurs.
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with observed prices in these periods.
30
Analyzing price data even in this simple environment is complicated because aggregation can occur not
only via transactions but also via bids and asks. In addition, even the time between two transactions
and/or between bids and asks may convey information. To avoid imposing assumptions about which
data to use, we report price data as average transaction prices per period.
31
3.1 Phenomena of information aggregation at the aggregate level
In this section, results are presented using data aggregated over all subjects depending on the realized
state but regardless of their individual private information. The evidence is based on transaction prices
and beliefs which are collected at the end of each period. In order to compare the results of as many
sessions as possible and since the dividend structure is the same except for a constant we compute the
deviation between the RE-prediction and the average transaction price of each period. Based on this
30
It is not obvious whether individual beliefs are the result of observed prices or vice versa.
31
The main results do not change if we calculate a last price for each period or if we take the average price of the last
(two) minute(s). The reason for this is a rather fast stabilization of transaction prices at some level, i.e. prices suggest a
fast convergence to a certain level which all participants can agree on. In addition, using average price data has the big
advantage that occasionally observable weird closing prices do not have an impact on the result especially since subject tend
to ignore them anyway.
18
data the mean and standard deviation is dened for each of the possible six (three) states in period A
(period B) which is displayed in table 3. The individual predictions are counted twice if a high bet is
chosen.
32
Table 3: Average transaction prices compared to RE and most common beliefs in sessions without H
B
-
claims
In the upper half of this table for each of the six possible states in period A the (second) most common prediction
Mode
1
(Mode
2
) is presented. Freq
1
(Freq
2
) is the weighted frequency of the (second) most common prediction. A pre-
diction with an associated high bet was counted twice. PD denotes the Price Dierence between the average transaction
price and the RE price of a period. Mean (PD) and StdDev (PD) are the mean and standard deviation of these price
dierences, respectively, which are computed over data from # Periods.
Period A H
A
H
B
L
A
H
B
H
A
M
B
L
A
M
B
H
A
L
B
L
A
L
B
Mode
1
H
A
M
B
L
A
H
B
H
A
M
B
L
A
M
B
H
A
M
B
L
A
L
B
Freq
1
0.388 0.287 0.586 0.476 0.336 0.333
Mode
2
H
A
H
B
L
A
M
B
H
A
H
B
H
A
M
B
H
A
L
B
L
A
M
B
Freq
2
0.223 0.279 0.167 0.267 0.280 0.304
Mean (PD) -206.44 -131.04 -20.96 -1.58 114.29 207.24
StdDev (PD) 59.49 53.60 42.31 97.41 86.01 21.61
# Periods 9 20 11 16 18 4
Period B H
B
H
B
M
B
M
B
L
B
L
B
Mode
1
H
B
H
B
M
B
M
B
L
B
L
B
Freq
1
0.478 0.444 0.767 0.808 0.466 0.800
Mode
2
M
B
M
B
L
B
H
B
M
B
M
B
Freq
2
0.375 0.406 0.122 0.126 0.351 0.133
Mean (PD) -86.54 -120.76 31.55 47.70 194.79 155.74
StdDev (PD) 54.16 48.46 43.49 66.92 104.98 122.87
# Periods 9 20 11 16 18 4
The dierence between the six possible states in period A is quite striking. As table 3 shows the most
common predictions are wrong in two states, H
A
H
B
and H
A
L
B
. The most common prediction is H
A
M
B
in these two cases. Moreover, the relative frequencies of the (correct) most common predictions vary
between 28.7% (state L
A
H
B
) and 58.6% (state H
A
M
B
). Remember, that according to the RCM model
the correct prediction should be the most common with a Mode
1
=
5
18
(=27.8%) in period A and
Mode
1
=
4
9
(=44.4%) in period B assuming all subjects taking the same bet. It is obvious that a lot of
traders are not able to predict the correct state and thus they do not reach the RE equilibrium in period
A.
Table 3 shows, too, for states H
A
M
B
and L
A
M
B
that average transaction prices are close to, i.e. less
32
The results would not change dramatically if each prediction is counted once regardless of the associated bet.
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than 48 cu away from the RE level. In addition, the most common beliefs with their associated relative
frequencies indicate that information aggregation is observable especially at the end of period B. For
example, in state H
A
M
B
average transaction prices are on average only -20.96 cu (31.55 cu) below
(above) the RE level in period A (B). The most common prediction over 11 periods is the correct state
H
A
M
B
(58.6% of all weighted predictions) at the end of period A. 16.7% of weighted predictions indicate
state H
A
H
B
(second most common prediction) as being correct which might explain prices above the
RE-level.
But table 3 also demonstrates that severe information aggregation problems exist in some other states.
If state H
A
L
B
occurs the mean of price dierences compared to RE in period B is 194.79 cu which is
equivalent to the M
B
level. In addition, only 46.6% of all weighted predictions are correct compared
to 44.4% predict by RCM, i.e. assuming no learning in addition to private information. Moreover, the
most common prediction (H
A
M
B
) is wrong in period A and state M
B
still receives 35.1% of weighted
predictions in period B compared to 27.8% predicted by RCM.
The results for state L
A
H
B
are remarkable, too.
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In both periods a tie between the most common and
the second most common prediction is observable. Notice, that the frequency of the correct most common
prediction in both periods is equal to the RCM prediction. The second most common predictions is higher
than predicted by RCM (27.9% vs. 19.4% (period A); 40.6% vs. 27.8% in period B). These predictions
indicate that subjects have learned that state H
A
L
B
or L
A
L
B
will not occur. We will see later using
mean absolute deviations of beliefs whether traders can distinguish between the remaining states or not.
Another the RE-level. In period B the mean dierence of -120.76cu is close to the PI equilibrium, i.e. the
highest expected value for any information group based only on private information (NOTL
B
): In 10
out of 20 B-periods the average transaction price is less than 30 cu away from the PI-level whereas in
period A 15 out of 20 average transaction prices are below the PI-level (see gure 7 below). Since the
PI-level is 100 cu below the RE-level in both periods this observation is evidence for some learning from
period A to period B although information aggregation is not perfect.
In state L
A
L
B
predictions and mean price dierences in period B can be used as evidence of information
aggregation and against it, respectively, because 80% of the weighted predictions are for the correct state
L
B
but the average price dierence (+155.74cu) strongly favors state M
B
. State H
A
H
B
is predicted less
often than the RCM model suggests and the most common prediction is false (state H
A
M
B
, 38.8%).
In addition, the price dierence to RE (-206.44cu) strongly supports the most common prediction. The
improvement in both, predictions and price deviations indicate learning although this is not sucient to
arrive at the RE-level. These mixed results for states H
A
H
B
and L
A
L
B
are the reason why we do not
focus on them in particular analyzing data at the aggregate level. However, these states will be included
in the analysis at the information group level.
Result 1: Information aggregation can be observed but the reliability depends on the state.
Result 1.1: States with reliable information aggregation are H
A
M
B
and L
A
M
B
.
33
Note that states L
A
H
B
and H
A
L
B
are equivalent concerning the information structure.
20
Based on average transaction prices aggregation occurred in 9 of 11 A- and B-periods in state H
A
M
B
as
can be seen in gure 7a. The deviation from the RE-level is not signicantly (t=-0.928 (A); t=1.693 (B))
dierent from 0 in both periods. If state L
A
M
B
occured aggregation was achieved in 6 out of 14 periods
in both periods, i.e. aggregation did not improve in period B. On the contrary, average deviation from
the RE-level increased and is signicantly positive in period B (t=3.292).
Figure 7: Deviation of transaction prices from the RE-level: states 
A
M
B
, no H
B
-claims
The median, maximum and minimum deviations of transaction prices from the RE-level are shown for each session in which
either state H
A
M
B
or state L
A
M
B
occurred. In addition the deviation of the private information equilibrium is displayed.
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In gure 7 the median transaction price deviations from the RE-level are shown for both, period A and
period B. All transaction prices are weighted with the traded quantity. In addition, the PI-level deviation
and both the maximum and minimum deviations are provided. The number of the session is displayed,
too. The same session number indicates that there were more than one observation per session.
As discussed before information aggregation need not necessarily to be achieved via transactions. It
can also be the result of bids to buy or asks to sell. Moreover, traders might abstain from trading for
whatever reasons although their beliefs are correct. Therefore, the distribution of beliefs is important
to determine whether or not market participants have aggregated all available information. The data in
21
table 4 contains all predictions weighted by their associated bets, i.e. high bets are counted twice.
34
Table 4: Distribution of beliefs in sessions without H
B
-claims
In this table the distribution of beliefs for all sessions without H
B
-claims are shown for both, period A and B. Correct
predictions are in bold. To determine whether period A information is aggregated at the end of this period the sums H
A

B
and L
A

B
with 
B
2 fH
B
;M
B
; L
B
g are provided. In addition, the p-value of the binomial test (bitest) is given.
Period A
Prediction
State H
A
H
B
L
A
H
B
H
A
M
B
L
A
M
B
H
A
L
B
L
A
L
B
H
A

B
L
A

B
bitest=
5
18
H
A
H
B
27 22 47 8 9 8 83 38 0.8716
L
A
H
B
33 76 45 74 22 15 100 165 0.2622
H
A
M
B
27 2 95 19 16 3 138 24 0.0000
L
A
M
B
8 20 60 107 15 15 83 142 0.0000
H
A
L
B
30 28 84 29 70 9 184 66 0.4430
L
A
L
B
1 6 2 21 16 23 9 60 0.1327
Period B
Prediction
State H
B
M
B
L
B
bitest=
4
9
(H
A
)H
B
65 51 20 0.3684
(L
A
)H
B
140 128 47 0.3579
(H
A
)M
B
21 145 23 0.0000
(L
A
)M
B
30 193 16 0.0000
(H
A
)L
B
57 110 146 0.3699
(L
A
)L
B
6 12 72 0.0000
In table 4 a summary of all predictions aggregated over all sessions depending on the occurring state is
presented for both periods. This table provides a rst impression about the belief data for computing
the mean absolute deviation of beliefs from RE, i.e W
A;B
RE
(RE) = 0 (see gure 8). Period A information
is aggregated only if more than two thirds of the traders predict the period A state correctly since one
third of all traders has perfect information about this state. Without any information aggregation at
least
5
18
(
4
9
) of all predictions should be correct under the RCM assumptions at the end of period A (B).
35
The binomial tests support result 1 that in period A and B states 
A
M
B
with 
A
2 fH
A
; L
A
g can be
predicted better than random guessing.
34
Again, the results are essentially identical without incorporating the bets.
35
The reference value for each state in period A would be
5
18
if all subjects guessed because one third of the participants
can rule out three of the six possible states with their information about period A. The other two thirds of the subjects can
rule out just two states, thus
1
3

1
3
+
2
3

1
4
=
5
18
. In period B, one third of the traders is uninformed and tow thirds know
that one of two possible states will occur:
1
3

1
3
+
2
3

1
2
=
4
9
.
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The aggregated beliefs in state H
A
M
B
conrm result 1.1 since all available information is aggregated in
period A although the aggregation is not perfect. In period A 95 of 162 predictions are correct which is
signicantly larger than the prediction by RCM. The ratio of correct predictions of the period A dividend
is 138 to 24. In period B information is aggregated, too, since 145 out of 199 predictions are correct which
is again signicantly larger than the proportion predicted by RCM. In state L
A
M
B
the B-information is
aggregated both, in period A and period B which is indicated by the result of the bitest. In period A
(B) 107 out of 225 (193 out of 239) predictions are correct. However, A-information is not aggregated
in period A since traders could not distinguish between H
A
and L
A
which predicted at a ratio of 60 to
107.
36
In contrast to the evidence oered by the transaction prices most traders predict the A-information
correctly (60 out of 69). The B-information is only partially aggregated in period A because traders are
only convinced that 
A
H
B
and H
A
M
B
can be ruled out. In period B 72 out of 90 predictions are correct.
If state H
A
H
B
, H
A
L
B
or L
A
H
B
occurred aggregation would not be observed in period B. This evidence
will lead to result 2 and will be analyzed later.
Computing the mean absolute deviation of beliefs for each period and averaging by states oers a dierent
perspective about the belief data by emphasizing extreme cases of either aggregation or misaligned beliefs.
Figure 8 shows the average mean absolute deviations of beliefs depending on the realized state computed
against the RE-benchmark.
Figure 8: Average mean absolute deviations of beliefs with standard errors depending on the realized
state: all information groups combined
This gure shows the average mean absolute deviations of beliefs depending on the realized state computed against the
RE-benchmark. The mean absolute deviation of beliefs of the RCM model from RE based on all period A predictions is
denoted by W
A
RE
(RCM
all
) =
1
2

 
7
36
+
7
36
+
 
1 
10
36

+
3
36
+
3
36
+
6
36

=
13
18
. In period B the mean absolute deviation of
beliefs is W
B
RE
 
RCM
all

=
1
2

 
5
18
+
5
18
+
 
1 
8
18

=
5
9
. In addition to the average mean absolute deviation of beliefs the
one standard error interval is provided.
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Remember that A-informed traders should always predict the correct A-dividend and thus the expected ratio of random
guessing should be 1:2.
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For each of the six states the average mean absolute deviation of beliefs from RE (=0) is marked by a
diamond. The diamond is lled in period A and unlled in period B. In addition, the one standard error
interval is provided. The straight line (broken line) at
13
18

5
9

in period A (B) is the second benchmark:
the mean absolute deviation of beliefs of the RCM model.
Obviously, information aggregation can be observed on average for states H
A
M
B
and L
A
M
B
in both,
period A and period B but the aggregation is not complete. The average mean absolute deviation of
beliefs for state H
A
M
B
is 0.417 at the end of period A. The RCM model predicts an average mean
absolute deviation of beliefs of
13
18
(=0.722) which is signicantly higher than the observed distance. At
the end of period B the average mean absolute deviation of beliefs has been reduced to 0.292 compared
to
5
9
(=0.556) for the RCM model moving further towards RE. The average mean absolute deviations of
beliefs in state L
A
M
B
in period A and B are 0.521 and 0.317, respectively.
In state L
A
L
B
the aggregation takes place in period B

W
B
RE
(L
A
L
B
; all) = 0:319

although in period
A almost no deviation from the RCM line can be seen

W
A
RE
(L
A
L
B
; all) = 0:672

. Moreover, the mean
transaction price dierence from RE has not indicated such an improvement in information aggrega-
tion either which demonstrates the necessity and value to analyze both prices and beliefs.
37
However,
aggregation does not occur in all states as the results for states H
A
H
B
;H
A
L
B
and L
A
H
B
will show.
Result 1.2: States with unreliable information aggregation are H
A
L
B
and L
A
H
B
.
Again, the evidence is based on our two data sets, i.e. prices and beliefs. In gure 9 the median deviation
of transaction prices from the RE-level are provided for each period depending on the states 
A
H
B
and

A
L
B
(see gure 7 for states 
A
M
B
).
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Nonaggregation is obvious looking at gure 9. In state H
A
H
B
average transaction prices are even lower
than the PI-level (=-150cu) in 7 out of 9 cases in period A. But in period B prices suggest partial
information aggregation since they are closer to state H
B
than to state M
B
in 8 out of 9 periods.
However, in six periods prices are still closer to the PI-level (=-100cu) than to the RE-level. In 17 of 20
A-periods with state L
A
H
B
prices are closer to PI (=-150cu) than to RE. In nine B-periods prices are
closer to M
B
than to H
B
with an additional four periods in which prices are exactly halfway (=-100cu)
between both states. If state L
B
occurs in period B and state H
A
(L
A
) is observed in period A, 13 of 18
(three of four) average transaction prices are closer to the PI-level which is equivalent to state M
B
! The
same result holds in period A for these two states.
Based on the average mean absolute deviations of beliefs aggregated over all information groups de-
pending on the state which are displayed in gure 8 it is obvious that no aggregation occurred in states
H
A
H
B
; L
A
H
B
and H
A
L
B
in both periods A and B. The average mean absolute deviation of beliefs is
almost exactly at the RCM level which means that random predictions would yield the same result.
Notice that the average mean absolute deviation of beliefs is closer to the maximum distance (=1) than
37
The aggregation via bids to buy and asks to sell is one possible explanation. However, it is not obvious why this occurs
in this state. But it should be remembered that we have only four periods with state L
A
L
B
in sessions without an H
B
-claim
market.
38
The elimination of 5% or 10% most extreme price deviations within each period does not change the result.
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Figure 9: Deviation of transaction prices from the RE-level: states 
A
H
B
and 
A
L
B
, no H
B
-claims
The median, maximum and minimum deviations of transaction prices from the RE-level are shown for each session in which
either states 
A
H
B
or states 
A
L
B
occurred. In addition the deviation of the private information equilibrium is displayed.
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to RE (=0) in both periods. However, table 4 shows, too, that the distribution of predictions diers from
the RCM prediction. For example, there are too many prediction of state H
A
M
B
in states H
A
H
B
and
H
A
L
B
compared to the RCM model. This is another hint that even nonaggregation might have some
regularities.
An obvious, but wrong inference would be to conclude that evidence of table 4 suggests a M
B
bias,
namely that subjects tend to predict state M
B
too often regardless of the realized state which might
explain why we observe information aggregation in states H
A
M
B
and L
A
M
B
. We will show in the next
subsection with data for each information group that the information is aggregated in both states and
that the nature of misaligned beliefs leads to this puzzling result at the aggregated level.
3.2 Phenomena at the information group level
As mentioned briey in the previous section the aggregation of belief data across all information groups
25
covers crucial evidence to explain the observed nonaggregation. Since all market participants receive
common dividends and have full knowledge about the information structure, information should have
been aggregated. Thus, it is surprising that nonaggregation seems to happen frequently and to be state
dependent. Belief data aggregated by information groups will help to explain result 1.
The reliability of information aggregation is not only state dependent but depends also on the private
information as can be seen in gure 10. For each of the six states the average mean absolute deviation
of beliefs (lled symbol) with one standard error intervals (unlled symbols) is displayed. Results for
information groups H
A
and L
A
are marked with circles. Diamonds, squares and triangles are used for
information groups NOTH
B
, NOTM
B
and NOTL
B
, respectively.
The mean absolute deviation of beliefs of the RCM predictions (solid line) for A-informed traders is
W
A;B
RE
(RCM
A-info
) =
2
3
=
1
2


1
3

1
3
+
1
3

1
3
+
1
3

2
3

in both, period A and period B since these traders
have to choose between three states. B-informed traders can eliminate only two states in period A which
leads to a RCM value of W
A
RE
(RCM
B-info
) =
3
4
=
1
2


1
4
+
1
4
+
1
4
+
3
4

(broken line). In period B the
RCM value for these information groups is W
B
RE
(RCM
B-info
) =
1
2
=
1
2


1
2
+
1
2

because traders can
predict one of two (ex ante) equally likely states. Results for period A are shown in gure 10a and for
period B in gure 10b.
For example, in state H
A
H
B
in period A the average mean absolute deviation of beliefs for information
group H
A
(=A-info) is 0.8 (lled circle) with a standard error of 0.073. The RCM prediction for this
group is
2
3
. The average mean absolute deviations of beliefs of information groups NOTM
B
(squares)
and NOTL
B
(triangle) are 0.77 and 0.79, respectively, which is slightly higher than the RCM value of
0.75.
The information group data conrms our results 1.1 and 1.2, i.e. reliable information aggregation can be
observed in states H
A
M
B
, L
A
M
B
and L
A
L
B
, but almost no aggregation can be found in the other states.
States H
A
M
B
and L
A
M
B
are aggregated on average by all three information groups both in period A
and B indicated by the average mean absolute deviations of beliefs which are signicantly smaller than
the RCM distances. However, aggregation is not complete since on average about 1.5 out of 5 traders
are predicting the wrong state in period B. Sometimes, aggregation is perfect. For example, in period 16
of session 9511271 with experienced subjects the mean absolute deviations of beliefs for each information
group are equal to zero, i.e. every trader predicts the correct state (H
A
)M
B
. In the previous period A
aggregation can be observed within the B-informed groups but the H
A
-informed traders have not learned
(as a group) anything since the mean absolute deviation of beliefs is
2
3
. Periods with (almost) perfect
aggregation can be found for each of the six states.
Figure 10 reveals dierences between information groups, too. Most striking is the learning by NOTM
B
-
informed traders in every state. Information NOTH
B
obviously hinder in learning the correct state
(H
A
)L
B
and thus the mean absolute deviation of beliefs in period B is not only greater than that of
NOTM
B
-informed subjects but also greater than predicted by RCM: NOTH
B
-informed traders \learn"
the wrong state, i.e. M
B
. The same is true for NOTL
B
-informed market participants if state H
B
occurs.
Moreover, A-informed subjects do not learn either in states with NOTM
B
information. Thus, possession
of NOTM
B
information leads to partial aggregation but this information does not reach the market. If
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Figure 10: Average mean absolute deviations of beliefs with one standard error intervals depending on
the realized state for all information groups
In this gure the mean absolute deviations of beliefs are shown separately for all information groups depending on the
realized state. The mean absolute deviation of beliefs of the RCM model from RE based on period A predictions of a
specic information group is denoted by W
RE
(RCM
info
). Thus, the RCM baseline for period A informed participants is
W
A;B
RE
(RCM
A-info
) =
2
3
=
1
2

 
1
3

1
3
+
1
3

1
3
+
1
3

2
3

. The baseline for period B informed subjects is W
A
RE
(RCM
B-info
) =
3
4
=
1
2

 
1
4
+
1
4
+
1
4
+
3
4

in period A and W
B
RE
(RCM
B info
) =
1
2
=
1
2

 
1
2
+
1
2

in period B. Results for information groups
H
A
and L
A
are marked with circles. Diamonds, squares and triangles are used for information groups NOTH
B
, NOTM
B
and NOTL
B
, respectively. The one standard error interval is denoted by the information group's unlled symbol.
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learning occurs it can be mostly observed in period A since period B improvements seem only to be the
result of private information. This indicates the existence of a relatively stable situation in period B.
Most of our following analysis will focus on period B because dierences in beliefs have a more obvious
impact on prices since dividends dier at least by 200 cu. In addition, the information situation is simpler.
A-informed traders are uninformed in period B and thus cannot help with the aggregation process. As
before, we analyze the relative frequencies of individual beliefs including the strength of beliefs for each
of the possible three states. Then we compute the mean absolute deviation of beliefs for each information
27
group. Mean absolute deviations of beliefs which are greater than the RCM prediction for B-informed
traders are a signal for the existence of misaligned beliefs. Based on this data we can support the next
result:
Result 2: Misaligned beliefs exist.
One of the most extreme examples can be observed in trading year 7 of session 9511091 (state L
A
H
B
).
The mean absolute deviations of beliefs in period A for information groups NOTM
B
, NOTL
B
and L
A
are 0.5, 1 and 0.75, respectively. These numbers do not necessarily indicate misaligned beliefs. However,
all three groups have a mean absolute deviation of beliefs of 1 in period B, i.e. all NOTM
B
-informed
predict state L
B
and all NOTL
B
-informed predict state M
B
. In addition, none of the L
A
-informed
traders believes that state H
B
will occur. However, information groups' average beliefs are spread out
over the whole range of possible outcomes as gure 11 shows for all possible states in period B.
The distribution of mean absolute deviations of beliefs in states H
A
M
B
, L
A
M
B
and L
A
L
B
clearly un-
derline result 1 that information aggregation is reliable. Mean absolute deviations of beliefs which are
greater than the RCM prediction can be observed only in a few periods. As further data will show,
there exist no period in which more than one information group has an average belief which suggests
nonaggregation. In states H
A
H
B
and L
A
H
B
partial aggregation is achieved since there are only some
periods in which NOTM
B
informed traders predict state L
B
. Period A informed who are uninformed
in period B basically rule out state L
B
in all but one period. However, the distribution of information
groups' mean absolute deviations of beliefs clearly demonstrates that aggregation is not reliably achieved.
Finally, in state H
A
L
B
nonaggregation seems to be most common since the mean absolute deviation of
beliefs of the H
A
-informed traders is close to the maximum distance in eight out of sixteen periods. In
addition, in seven periods at least two information groups have mean absolute deviations of beliefs which
are close to the maximum distances as table 5 shows. But, aggregation is observable in some periods and
clustering around 0.5 indicates random guessing in other periods.
Extreme cases in which an information group is completely misaligned are rather rare. Only in one
period all three groups have perfect misaligned beliefs. In three periods two groups' beliefs correspond to
the maximum mean absolute deviation of beliefs. The next step is to relax the denition of misaligned
beliefs to understand the often huge deviations between transaction prices and the certicates value.
A-informed traders are uninformed in period B and thus can serve as an indicator of the degree of
information aggregation. If their beliefs lead to a mean absolute deviation of beliefs between the RCM
value

2
3

and the maximum distance (=1) this information group will be labeled as misligned in this
period. B-period informed subjects whose RCM value is
1
2
have information and thus will be only seen
as misaligned if the mean absolute deviation of beliefs is not less than 0.75 which is half way between the
RCM value and the maximum distance. Table 5 oers evidence how reliable information aggregation is
aggregated and how often misaligned beliefs evolved.
In table 5 a period is counted under \aggregation" (0 W
R
E  0:258info groups) if at least one group
has a mean absolute deviation of beliefs of less than
1
4
which is half way between the RCM distance
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Figure 11: Mean absolute deviations of beliefs for all B-periods depending on the realized state for all
information groups
In this gure the mean absolute deviations of beliefs based on beliefs at the end of period B are shown for all information
groups depending on the realized states in both periods. Results for information groups H
A
and L
A
are marked with circles.
Diamonds, squares and triangles are used for information groups NOTH
B
, NOTM
B
and NOTL
B
, respectively.
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(=0.5) and the RE distance (=0) for period B informed.
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Conrming previous evidence the data in
table 5 demonstrates that aggregation is reliable in states H
A
M
B
, L
A
M
B
and L
A
L
B
. It is not reliable
in the other three states in which misaligned beliefs occur frequently. In addition, it can be seen that
misaligned beliefs in state H
A
L
B
are aecting at least two groups more often than in state L
A
H
B
. In
general, situations with neither aggregation or nonaggregation are not often observed. Moreover, there
exists no period in which an information group identies the correct state and another group is misaligned.
At this point we can address the M
B
-bias, i.e. overprediction of state M
B
would yield the same result.
39
Alternatively, one can compute the sum of all three mean absolute deviations of beliefs to identify misaligned beliefs
and aggregation. The results are very similar but do not oer as much structural insights since
7
5
= 1+
1
5
+
1
5
=
2
5
+
3
5
+
2
5
.
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Table 5: Misaligned beliefs and aggregation in sessions without H
B
-claims
In this table information groups' beliefs in each B-period is classied. If the mean absolute deviation of beliefs of one group
is smaller than 0.25 the period will be classied as aggregated. A mean absolute deviation of beliefs of more than 0.75 leads
to the classication of misaligned. All other cases remain undecided.
period B (H
A
)H
B
(L
A
)H
B
(H
A
)M
B
(L
A
)M
B
(H
A
)L
B
(L
A
)L
B
aggregation 2 5 7 12 5 4
undecided 2 2 2 0 2 0
one group misaligned 1 4 1 1 2 0
2 or 3 groups misaligned 3 6 0 0 7 0
P
8 17 10 13 16 4
This is not the case mainly for two reasons. First, traders had no incentive to predict always state M
B
since it occurred only with probability
1
3
and wrong predictions lead to a smaller payment. Second and
more important is the following observation:
Observation:Misaligned beliefs of NOTH
B
- and NOTL
B
-informed traders can only occur if they
predict state M
B
too often.
Result 2 motivates an important question. Can misaligned beliefs persist or are they only a transitory
state in the process of information aggregation? This question is closely connected to the question
whether information traps exist which are a self conrming equilibrium in the sense of Fudenberg and
Levine (1993a,b).
Result 3: Information traps exist.
As the following example shows information traps occur. As in this example, we will concentrate on traps
in state H
A
L
B
in which the short selling constraint binds. Then, we will explain why information traps
can be observed in other states, too.
In this trading year of session 9511091 state H
A
L
B
occurred. In period A most transactions are made
at a price of about 700cu which are supported by relatively small bid/ask-spreads. This pattern clearly
indicates state H
A
M
B
. At the end of period A state H
A
is announced and trading opens in period B
exactly 300cu lower at 400cu. After about two minutes transaction prices reach 600cu indicating state
H
B
and stay there until the end of the trading year. At this point all H
A
-informed and four of the
ve NOTM
B
-informed traders predict state H
B
. All but one of the NOTH
B
traders who know that
this cannot be correct predict state M
B
. All except three traders have ruled out the correct state L
B
at the end of period A, too. To establish the existence of an information trap, it is necessary to show
that those participants with the crucial information, i.e. the information which is needed to switch to the
RE equilibrium have no incentive or no opportunity to do so. As a result these participants can neither
transmit their information to the market nor prot from the \obvious" mispricing. In this particular
state (H
A
L
B
) and prices indicating state H
B
, the most crucial information is NOTH
B
.
The question to be addressed is why this information seems to be lost to the market. Since we assume
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Figure 12: Information Trap: session 9511091, trading year 4
In this trading year state H
A
L
B
occurs which corresponds to a fundamental value in period A of 500cu and in period B of
200cu. Between both periods participants receive the dividend of 300cu. Diamonds, squares, and circles denote asks, bids,
and transactions, respectively. The solid horizontal line indicates the RE-level. Other possible levels are drawn as broken
horizontal lines.
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that all traders prefer earning more money NOTH
B
-informed traders should sell as many certicates as
possible regardless of their risk attitude if the price is higher than the highest possible dividend payment
based on their information, i.e. 400cu in period B. The numbers of certicates a trader can sell is limited
to her initial endowment. Therefore, the denition of when a subject reaches a boundary seems to be
obvious in our design: due to the shortselling restriction in most sessions but no credit restriction, subjects
are at the boundary only if they have sold all their certicates. But the information of a subject will be
lost for the market in any case if a subject does (can) not use her information, i.e. submit oers to buy
or to sell certicates or does not trade based on her private information.
40
Therefore, the denition of
an eective boundary is necessary. A subject's eective boundary is reached after her last trade within
a trading year. Note that the notion of an eective boundary captures all cases in which a trader has no
incentive to trade.
Conjecture: NOTH
B
-informed subjects reach an eective boundary in period A.
To prove this conjecture is dicult for two reasons. The rst problem is that you do not have an
incentive to trade in an equilibrium regardless of whether this is the RE-equilibrium or a trap. Moreover,
you will not trade if you fear that you do not understand why the observable price is contradicted by
40
Some behavioral explanations such as paralysis, scalping and plunging will be discussed in the next section.
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your own private information, i.e. you are paralyzed (see section 4.1). The second problem is to dene
the situation when a subject has reached her eective boundary. To illustrate the problem suppose
you have information NOTH
B
and thus you are selling certicates whenever the price is higher than
H
A
M
B
in period A. But when you observe enormous buying pressure you decide to wait in order to let
prices increase even further to earn more money collecting the period A dividend and selling the other
certicates in period B. Thus your information is lost to the market although you sell certicates in
period B.
Nevertheless, we can provide evidence that the short selling restriction stabilized potential information
traps in state H
A
L
B
. A potential information trap exists if the average price deviation from RE in
period B is greater than 100 cu, i.e. prices indicate a dierent state. In these periods 28 out of 65 traders
(=43%) did not change their position in period B whereas only 11% of uninformed traders (H
A
) and
27% of NOTM
B
-informed did not change their position in period B. In contrast, about two thirds of
the traders (regardless of their private information) changed their position in period B in periods with
information aggregation and state H
A
L
B
.
In the other state (L
A
H
B
) in which information traps frequently occurred an eective boundary could
not be found. However, average net changes of positions show why aggregation is prevented. NOTM
B
-
informed traders buy on average 0.52 certicates in period A and sell 2.52 certicates in period B if an
information trap occurs in state L
A
H
B
. In contrast, they sell 2.16 certicates in period A and buy 0.08
certicates in B if aggregation can be observed. Aggregation seem to depend on the trading behavior of
NOTL
B
-informed participants. If they buy 7.46 certicates in period B aggregation will be achieved.
However, if they buy the same number of certicates in the whole trading year but only 4.25 in period
A, an information trap will occur. The reason for the necessity to buy certicates very aggressively
is the behavior of L
B
-informed traders who sell about ve certicates in period A. If these traders'
selling pressure becomes too strong so that NOTM
B
-informed traders begin to exclude state H
B
, the
information NOTL
B
is lost for the market.
In state H
A
L
B
the situation is just the other way around. If NOTH
B
-informed (-4.18) can counter the
buying pressure of H
A
-informed (+3.19) no information trap will be formed. However, if the buying
pressure is too high (+4.89) in period A and NOTH
B
-informed do not sell enough (-4.62) a trap will
develop which cannot be reversed in period B even though NOTH
B
-informed sell additional certicates
(-1.10). Similarly, in state H
A
H
B
aggregation depends most heavily on the trading behavior of NOTL
B
-
informed participants. If they buy enough certicates in period A (+4.09) then all information will be
aggregated. If they do not buy enough in period A (+1.82) aggregation will not be achieved until the
end of the trading year even though they buy on average 5.25 additional certicates in period B.
Summing up, information traps occur if the most valuable information within a trading year, i.e. NOTH
B
or NOTL
B
are not clearly signaled to the market in period A. Even if in period B additional trades might
oer the information, too, the signal jam in period A carries over and thus the most valuable information
is lost. In addition, it is obvious why states 
A
M
B
are aggregated more reliable: in these situations both
information, NOTH
B
and NOTL
B
, exist in the market. To which extent individual behavior, such as
\scalping" and \plunging" contribute to the development of misaligned beliefs and information traps will
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be studied in section 4.1.
3.3 Robustness of information traps?
Information traps are not observed in this experiment for the rst time. Sunder (1992) reports three
trading periods within his experiment in which a non revealing equilibrium occurred which was caused
by the short selling restriction (=eective boundary):
\Convergence to wrong prices occurred in later periods of these markets when many traders
seem to have become accustomed to being able to infer state from price. (...) all informed
traders were on the selling side and they became inactive after selling their endowment of
two certicates because of the restriction on short sale. Other traders had no way of knowing
that the informed traders had become inactive. Knowing that at least some trader(s) in
the market had perfect (and therefore superior to their own) information, the [un]informed
seemed willing to rely on the market to learn the state from prices. The blind leading the
blind, they arrived at the wrong conclusion in these three cases" (Sunder 1992, p. 690).
Note that contrary to Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) non revelation seemed to be the result of (perceived)
experience. On the other hand, Camerer and Weigelt (1991) did not observe information mirages in later
periods, i.e. traders seemed to be able to distinguish between uninformed and informed trades. Thus, we
have to check whether experience might reduce the number of information traps. Sunder mentioned four
conditions under which aggregation was not achieved in his experiment in some periods. These conditions
hold in our experiment, too, although they are not all necessary for the existence of information traps.
First, informed traders should have \perfect information while the uninformed had none" (Sunder 1992,
p. 691). In our experiment, the information was perfect since all private information was always correct
but not complete for each individual trader. Thus, the information structure seems to inuence the
aggregation process, too. Second, there were enough informed traders to achieve information aggregation
at least in some states. Third, information traps can arise even without a binding short sale restriction.
Finally, traders' inactivity cannot be observed by others in association with their private information
since no communication besides bidding and trading was allowed.
Obviously, the next step is testing the robustness of information traps. We study the eect of an additional
state contingent claim market, of the removal of the short sale restriction and of traders' experience.
The introduction of an additional H
B
-contingent claim market should remove all information traps.
41
Through the additional market the information NOTH
B
can be transmitted directly into the market and
thus eliminate all traps in states 
A
L
B
. Moreover, inactivity in this market should signal state H
B
. As a
result, signals from the additional market can easily be learned by other participants leading to (better)
information aggregation. It does not seem to be necessary to introduce a full set of state contingent claim
markets as in Plott and Sunder (1988).
Result 4: The addition of an H
B
-contingent claim market improves information aggregation but it does
not eliminate all information traps.
41
Alternatively, an additional L
B
-contingent claim market would have the same eect.
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Table 6 in comparison to table 3 oers rst hints that the H
B
-claim market improves information aggre-
gation. However, in some states information aggregation is (still) a problem or even worse than without
the H
B
-claims.
Table 6: Average transaction prices compared to RE and average frequencies of beliefs in sessions with
H
B
-claims
In the upper half of this table for each of the six possible states in period A the (second) most common prediction
Mode
1
(Mode
2
) is presented. Freq
1
(Freq
2
) is the weighted frequency of the (second) most common prediction. A pre-
diction with an associated high bet was counted twice. PD denotes the Price Dierence between the average transaction
price and the RE price of a period. Mean (PD) and StdDev (PD) are the mean and standard deviation of these price
dierences, respectively, which are computed over data from # Periods.
Period A H
A
H
B
L
A
H
B
H
A
M
B
L
A
M
B
H
A
L
B
L
A
L
B
Mode
1
H
A
L
B
L
A
H
B
H
A
M
B
L
A
M
B
H
A
L
B
L
A
L
B
Freq
1
0.286 0.556 0.388 0.714 0.582 0.456
Mode
2
H
A
H
B
L
A
M
B
L
A
M
B
H
A
M
B
L
A
M
B
H
A
L
B
Freq
2
0.224 0.153 0.388 0.179 0.164 0.237
Mean (PD) -270.66 -181.18 -115.77 10.41 82.82 52.53
StdDev (PD) 109.74 63.79 21.66 20.77 70.06 54.26
# Periods 6 8 6 6 6 12
Period B H
B
H
B
M
B
M
B
L
B
L
B
Mode
1
M
B
H
B
M
B
M
B
L
B
L
B
Freq
1
0.469 0.697 0.806 0.970 0.883 0.786
Mode
2
H
B
M
B
H
B
H
B
=L
B
M
B
M
B
Freq
2
0.391 0.253 0.145 0.015 0.083 0.176
Mean (PD) -127.07 -69.05 55.68 2.21 74.70 86.93
StdDev (PD) 104.91 54.22 89.21 5.31 91.32 70.96
# Periods 6 8 6 6 6 12
Comparing the data of table 6 with table 3 shows that aggregation improves with H
B
-claims especially
in states H
A
L
B
and L
A
L
B
. For example, the average price deviation from RE drops from -195cu to 75cu
and the prediction frequency for the correct state increases from 0.466 to 0.883 in state H
A
L
B
. In general,
aggregation is achieved more reliably in all states but state H
A
H
B
. In this state either aggregation is
achieved or an information trap occurs at state M
B
. Basically the same inference can be drawn from the
average mean absolute deviations of beliefs which are shown in gure 13.
The comparison of gures 8 and 13 shows an that mean absolute deviations of beliefs are on average
smaller. With the exception of state H
A
H
B
, a clear movement from the RCM benchmark to the RE
level can be observed in period A. In period B the mean absolute deviation of beliefs is decreasing further
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Figure 13: Average mean absolute deviations of beliefs with standard errors depending on the realized
state: all information groups combined (with H
B
-claims)
This gure shows the average mean absolute deviations of beliefs depending on the realized state computed against the
RE-benchmark in sessions with an additional H
B
-claim market. The mean absolute deviation of beliefs of the RCM model
from RE based on all period A predictions is denoted byW
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and is in state L
A
M
B
on average almost equal to zero, i.e. reaching the RE level.
42
However, the mean
absolute deviation of beliefs in state H
A
H
B
is equal to the RCM benchmark. But the huge standard
deviation in period B supports in combination with the most common and the second most common
prediction (see table 3) the notion that unreliable information aggregation exists with extreme values,
i.e. misaligned beliefs and perfect aggregation in dierent trading years.
The development of one of these traps based on perfect misaligned beliefs is described in section 4.2. The
basic problem is the fast reaction of the H
B
-claim market to the information NOTH
B
if this information
exists. Since this fast movement in two thirds of all trading years results in no trading opportunity for
the worthless certicates some traders try to unwind their position regardless of their own information.
Using then the price movement in the H
B
-claim market to infer (wrongly) that state H
B
will not occur
leads to an information trap since no market participant has the information that H
B
is the correct state.
Summing up, the introduction of an H
B
-claim market improves the reliability of information aggregation
but information traps still occur.
Result 5: Removing the short selling restriction does not improve information aggregation.
Eliminating the short selling restriction is certainly another intuitive way of eliminating most information
traps in state H
A
L
B
because they can exist under this condition only if all subjects with the crucial infor-
42
The mean absolute deviations of beliefs do not dier between information groups in sessions with H
B
-claims.
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mation stop trading for endogenous reasons, i.e. they are not willing to participate in risky transactions.
Note however that information traps in state L
A
H
B
occur even with unlimited money supply! There-
fore, another explanation seems to be appropriate to understand the stability of misaligned beliefs and
information traps. As the following example (H
A
L
B
) shows the removal of the short selling restriction
decreases the average price deviation from the RE level but misaligned beliefs and an information trap
still occur. In this example with short selling, a situation arises in which two thirds of the participants
prevent inadvertently the other third from oering their information. In session 9512121, year 4, prices
stay at the M
B
-level in period B because as soon as prices go up someone with information NOTH
B
will
sell one unit. On the other hand a price drop is prevented by the period A informed who exclude state
L
B
from the possible states because of what they have \learned" in period A. As a result, the NOTM
B
-
informed who know that the observed transaction prices are wrong are not able to communicate their
information to the market especially since the observed price is equal to their expected value assuming
risk neutrality. Thus they have no incentive to trade.
43
In this situation, the other two information
groups have aligned beliefs predicting the wrong state and have no incentive to take additional risk. As
a result, misaligned beliefs and the information trap are stable.
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As mentioned, using experienced participants might be another way to eliminate information traps. The
experiment of Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) demonstrate that information aggregation improves signi-
cantly with subjects' experience and if they are completely informed about the dividend and information
structures. The information structure was public knowledge in all sessions in our experiment. Moreover,
all subjects received the same state dependent dividend per certicate in all sessions since Plott and
Sunder (1988) have shown that aggregation results are (c.p.) best with common dividends.
Result 6: Experience helps but information aggregation problems remain.
In sessions 9511261 and 9511271 we checked the eect of experience by inviting subjects who participated
in earlier sessions.
45
In general, experienced subjects were better able to aggregate information and to
avoid getting into an information trap. However, traps still occurred which is the reason why we included
the data in the general analysis. At this point, the question remains how much experience subjects
need to aggregate information always. It is not obvious, that more experience increases the chances of
information becoming completely aggregated as a special session shows that is not included in the above
analysis. However, as the results with the H
B
-claim market show, more experience might lead to more
extreme forms of MAB.
The process of writing this paper and the discussions with colleagues and Ph.D. students lead to this
43
Even if they try the other information groups have enough resources to keep prices from moving away from the M
B
level. These other groups are convinced that this is the correct state and therefore the traders take every \certain prot"
they can get.
44
Since the removal of the short selling restriction does improve information aggregation at most only slightly we included
these sessions in our general analysis.
45
The subjects did not know that they would participate in the same experiment until they arrived in the lab. As a result,
they were not able to coordinate their strategies. In addition, we had a mixture of previous subject groups in each of the
two sessions to avoid a group eect.
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special session in which short selling was allowed and all twelve participants had to attend a presentation
about the nature of an information trap. In addition, one of the co-authors participated in this session.
The good news is that information aggregation could be observed at the end of each trading year even
without an additional H
B
-claim market. However, to achieve this aggregation the trading volume (be-
tween just six traders) reached a maximum of 150% of initially distributed certicates and mispricing
at the end of period A was higher than 200 cu. In addition, all subjects had the strong desire, besides
earning money, not to get into an information trap which might have prevented them, too.
An interesting result from related research is worth mentioning at this point, too. Plott, Wit and Yang
(1997) conducted parimutuel betting markets in which traders placed bets on which of six states would
occur. Bets on the state which actually occurred were paid o from the losing bets placed on states that
did not occur. Some of their sessions used a six-state structure like ours: a third of the traders could
eliminate three of the states and a third each could eliminate two states, so collectively they knew exactly
what the state was. Contrary to our results, the parimutuel betting markets aggregated information well,
i.e. most of the total money was bet on the correct state when the betting markets closed. Their results
show that trading institutions other than double auctions may aggregate information dierently (and
eliminate information traps). The optimal strategy in these betting markets is to wait until the very last
second before placing a bet. As a result, no one can learn anything from (not existing) transactions and
has to place his bets according to his private information which leads in these markets to information
aggregation.
46
4. Behavioral concepts and theoretical speculation
In this section we discuss some possible explanations illustrated by examples how information traps can
be caused. The data generated by this experiment do not allow a detailed statistical analysis because
the few restrictions imposed on the subjects' trading behavior allows too much variation in individual
behavior and the resulting price process. In addition, beliefs were collected only at the end of each period
and thus cannot serve as an explanation for the dynamic of an information trap. Nevertheless, it is useful
to study typical behavior and generate some post hoc theory.
4.1 Behavioral concepts
It appears that three types of non-classical decision rules which we call \paralysis", \scalping", and
\plunging", may contribute to the formation of information traps. In almost every observable trap some
traders are \paralyzed", i.e. not making riskless prots by buying or selling which contributes to traps by
keeping information from reaching the market. \Scalping" is observed when a single trader buys and sells
heavily in a period, and ends with no substantial net change in holdings. A scalper, by design, does not
46
Their results also suggest that as traders gain experience, information traps could become more likely, not less likely, in
parimutuel markets. The reason for this conjecture is that in some sessions with experienced traders, these traders tried to
manipulate the markets by betting on a state they knew was impossible, in order to lure other bettors to bet on that state
and eventually collect their money by later betting on the correct state. See Camerer (1987) for a related phenomenon, in
which more experienced traders produce larger probability biases in asset markets.
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try to move the price but simply tries to benet from small price movements which are mean-reverting.
As a result, scalping contributes to traps in two ways: It keeps the market from getting out of a trap, and
it adds noise or \signal-jamming" which makes it dicult for traders to infer information from prices.
Looking at several examples with an information trap one might have the suspicion that \plungers" are
causing the trap. \Plunging" occurs if a trader who knows that some subset of states are possible decides
early in a period that one of the states is \very likely", and trades aggressively on her belief.
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Plunging
is a special form of overcondence. For example, NOTM
B
-traders know the state is either H
B
or L
B
and
sometimes bet heavily on a hunch that the state was \certainly" L
B
. Plunging may contribute to a trap
because plungers will buy heavily from traders who have information indicating the plunger's hunch is
wrong, often buying all the available shares. The actions of plungers can also convince other uninformed
traders with the same information to make the same bet unless better informed traders counter this
aggressive trading.
Consider the following example: Subject 1 in session 9512121, year 4 (H
A
L
B
) who had the informationH
A
is clearly a plunger since she/he bought 27 certicates within period A (without having any information
about the second period) at an average price of about 50 cu less than the expected value based on the
private information. Her/his buying of 27 certicates accounted for 84% of all transactions in this period.
Although all participants could see (using an additional screen) that only one trader was buying all these
certicates the buying pressure convinced them that state L
B
would not occur and thus an information
trap started.
Note however, that there is no obvious evidence that plungers are causing information traps since they
exist in aggregation and nonaggregation. A test of net changes in positions depending on whether
information was aggregated in period B (less than 100 cu deviation from RE) or not, showed no signicant
dierences in the extent of plunging. One explanation for this result is the fact that plungers who bet on
the correct state will force the market to aggregate all available information because no participant has
contradicting information to the observed price movements. Thus, although plungers might contribute
to the evolution of an information trap their existence is not a sucient condition.
Scalpers identied by their high trading volume do not contribute signicantly to the development of
traps, too, since their existence is observable both in trading years with and without scalpers. As
mentioned above, scalpers introduce additional noise in the price discovery process and thus might support
the inuence of plungers.
Introducing more participants in this experiment to reduce the eect of an individual player might
have some appeal because this can reduce the inuence one participant might have in this type of
experiment. However, every additional subject increases the probability of observing individual mistakes
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Some of these behaviors might be explained by decision rules that are nonexpected utility maximizing. For example,
timidity and plunging are the opposite extremes of subjective expected utility maximization with non-additive beliefs, which
allow extreme aversion or preference for betting in uncertain situations (e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Ghirardato
(1997)). These decision rules capture phenomena like pessimism and optimism. That is, a timid or paralyzed trader is
one who pessimistically fears that whatever action she takes will turn out wrong. A plunger is the opposite, believing that
whatever hunch she has will turn out right.
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during the aggregation process which can lead to the formation of misaligned beliefs and information
traps. Moreover, more subjects can create more noise in the market and thus prevent the aggregation. It
is not clear, whether the reduced relative inuence will dominate the increased probability of individual
mistakes.
4.2 Speed and timing
The question how the information aggregation process really works is inuenced not only by subjects'
decisions but also by the timing of these decisions. If for example oers to sell (buy) certicates are
quickly accepted it is reasonable to conclude that the participant who bought (sold) the certicates has
information indicating that the oered price is too low (high). In addition, erce competition may force
the price of oers to sell quickly down indicating information NOTH
B
in this experiment. Trading year
5 of session 9511281 is an impressive example for the eect of speed and it's misinterpretation. The oers
and transaction prices of the certicate market (upper half) and the H
B
-claim market (lower half) are
shown in gure 14.
Figure 14: H
B
-claims cause nonaggregation
The RE-price is displayed as a solid (horizontal) line for both periods. Diamonds, squares, and circles denote asks, bids, and
transactions, respectively. The trading data of the certicate market are displayed in the upper half. The H
B
-claim data is
shown in the lower half.
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This example shows an information trap which is caused by the H
B
-claim market. In general, the
existence of an H
B
-claim market gives NOTH
B
-informed traders the opportunity to prot directly from
their private information, which can be seen in all situations with NOTH
B
-informed traders. In this
example, the distributed information consists of H
A
, NOTM
B
and NOTL
B
implying state H
A
H
B
(here:
=800 cu=200 (H
A
) + 600 (H
B
)).
The early oers to sell H
B
-claims (see gure 14) push the price close to 0 cu in the H
B
-claim market,
leading all participants to infer that state H
B
will not occur. Note that no subject knows with certainty
that theH
B
-dividend will be paid, so there is little upward pressure onH
B
-claim prices. As a consequence,
NOTM
B
- (NOTL
B
) informed traders conclude that either state L
A
L
B
(L
A
M
B
) or state H
A
L
B
(H
A
M
B
)
will occur. The H
A
-informed subjects are choosing between H
A
M
B
and H
A
L
B
.
After 80 seconds the rst transaction occurs in the certicate market at a price of about 400 cu which is
equivalent to state H
A
L
B
. Most of the transactions in period A are executed at prices close to 400 cu. At
the end of the period a high trading intensity

# oers
# trades

a increasing prices indicate the development
of period B.
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All NOTM
B
-informed and three H
A
-informed predict state H
A
L
B
at the end of period
B. Five traders predict an M
B
-dividend for the end of period B while only one participant believes that
H
B
will occur in period B.
At the beginning of period B two aggressive NOTL
B
-informed traders push the price to the M
B
-level
at 400 cu where prices remain until the end of the trading year. All NOTL
B
- and all H
A
-informed
participants predict state M
B
at the end of period B which can be translated to Wurtz distances from
RE of 1. In addition, all NOTM
B
-informed traders who can rule out this prediction are convinced that
state L
B
occurs.
In this case the information trap is stable because all participants obviously have no incentive to force the
market towards state H
B
which is \ruled out" by the H
B
-claim market. As expected, NOTL
B
-informed
traders buy a lot of certicates while NOTM
B
-informed traders who know that state M
B
will not occur,
sell all their certicates because they believe that the L
B
-dividend will be paid. One trader with the
NOTM
B
-information is paralyzed. The trap is stable, too, because even in period A seven traders take
the high bet. This number increases to eleven in period B which indicates the high condence in their
guesses.
As in this specic example, timing decisions concerning transactions might oer some insights in general
about how misaligned beliefs and traps can occur. Camerer and Weigelt (1991) showed that increased
trading intensity indicated noninsider periods which has to be learned by the participants. Sustained
\mirages can be thought of as errors in Bayesian inference of information from prices. In early periods,
traders have not yet learned the typical price paths in insider and noninsider periods. Noise trading
then generates a price path that resembles the path in a previous insider period, to which other traders
overreact" (p.490).
As the analysis of information traps (result 3) has already shown, the dierence between nonaggregation
and aggregation is not the result of dierences in overall trading volume or net change of position.
48
One of the NOTL
B
bought 48 certicates (participating in 60% of all transactions) in period A without having a
signicant price impact.
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However, some aspects of trading intensity, i.e. the relation between oers and transactions might oer
some insight at which point during a trading year misaligned beliefs might arise. We will focus on the two
cases in which information traps developed most frequently: states H
A
L
B
and L
A
H
B
. As before, trading
years are classied as nonaggregation years if the average price deviation from RE is greater than 100 cu
in period B. In contrast to Camerer and Weigelt (1991), trading intensity is not signicantly dierent in
the rst quarter (=105 seconds) of period A.
If state L
A
H
B
occurs trading intensity in period A is signicantly (p=0.081) lower in nonaggregation
situations than in aggregation years. More specically, if there are fewer bids and asks per transaction
than the likelihood of an information trap increases. This means that oers are accepted faster in period
A especially in the second and fourth quarter. In period B, however, the reverse is true: if information
is aggregated the trading intensity will be signicantly (p=0.012) higher in nonaggregation trading years
especially in the second half of the period. In other words, if information is aggregated less trading per
oer occurs. In state H
A
L
B
, the results are similar but not as crisp as in state L
A
H
B
. Trading intensity
is only slightly lower in trading years with aggregation than in nonaggregation years (p=0.368) although
the dierence is signicant in the second half of period A (p=0.068). In period B, the trading intensity
is signicantly (p=0.079) higher in years with information aggregation. This result is based mostly on
the trading pattern in the rst half of period B. In summary, there are dierences in trading intensities
between years with information traps and those with information aggregation. These dierences are the
result of a combination of factors such as plunging and scalping as well as other unidentied reasons.
At this point one might think about how and especially when a subject should act in this experiment to
avoid losing money because of trading based on misaligned beliefs. It is obvious that NOTH
B
(NOTL
B
)-
informed participants can use their information directly without relying on other than their private
information as long as the price is above state H
A
M
B
(below state L
A
M
B
). Under these circumstances
these subjects can trade risklessly. The period A informed can rule out only one extreme dividend payment
and therefore are unlikely to get the opportunity of trading without facing the risk of loosing money.
Trades by NOTM
B
-informed subjects are always risky. As a result participants with the information
R 2 fH
A
; L
A
; NOTM
B
g should wait before trading to receive a signal from those participants who can
make riskless trades. Otherwise, they will ignore the adverse selection problem that better informed
participants accept these oers only if this transaction yield a prot at the expense of the oering
participant.
Since the information structure in this experiment is common knowledge it is certain that either NOTH
B
or NOTL
B
informed participants (if not both) are in the market all participants with another information
should do nothing at the beginning of a year. If we assume that all traders do not want to participate
in risky trades, NOTH
B
and NOTL
B
informed should only post oers which would result in a riskless
prot if they were accepted. As a result, the oers to sell would go down to the H
A
M
B
-level and the
oers to buy would go up to the L
A
M
B
-level, respectively. At this point, the other market participants
can update their beliefs using their own information and the signaled information. Then, they might have
the opportunity to oer trades which would result in riskless prots until all information is aggregated.
Notice, that in this scenario no transaction would ever take place and all available information would be
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aggregated.
However, as soon as one subject is assumed to be willing to participate in risky trades the feedback of
price signals for the updating of beliefs is more complicated because now the updating procedure needs
additional assumptions about the risk aversion or willingness to participate in risky trades of all subjects.
For example, homogeneity of risk aversion among all participants makes it always possible to interpret
the price signals and thus allows information aggregation (without any trades).
4.3 Learning
The question how and when participants in this experiment learn within a trading year or across years
within one session can not be answered with our data. To get an answer to this question it is either
necessary to collect belief data throughout a trading year or to ask outside observers of the trading
process about their beliefs concerning the realized state or the amount of available information at any
given time. The question when subjects learn specic pieces of information is especially important since
we found a discrepancy in net changes of positions between non aggregation and aggregation: if the period
B information is not learned by the end of period A it will not become revealed at the end of period B.
In addition, unlearning of information occurs only in period A and not in period B. Thus, collecting real
time belief data would help to understand the evolution of information traps and the related information
mirages documented by Camerer and Weigelt (1991).
Summing up, the number of information traps can be reduced in several ways such as experience, allowing
short sales or introducing an H
B
-claim market or even using a completely dierent market structure
such as a call market with indicative prices. However, overcondence, i.e. plunging or scalping, and
paralysis can have a signicant eect on information aggregation especially if market participants have
no experience how to detect this behavior in the market. Last but not least, you should keep in mind that
in this simple setting the general information structure was common knowledge which helps to analyze
price movements and thus aggregate all available information.
5. Conclusions
With this experiment the existence of information traps as a result of misaligned beliefs is established in
markets with common knowledge about both, the information and the dividend structure. Information
traps result from individual non-rational behavior of at least one trader which can lead to misaligned
beliefs. Even if some traders realize that beliefs are misaligned they have either no incentive or no market
power to do anything against it. In general, prices reveal average beliefs but do not indicate the existence
of information traps. Even without short-selling restrictions or with an additional H
B
-claim market
misaligned beliefs and non revealing equilibria can be observed. H
B
-claims and experience reduce but
do not eliminate misaligned beliefs and information traps.
Whether our results depend heavily on the symmetry of our period B dividend structure has to be
analyzed in the future although every change in the information structure can lead to new problems: For
example, if two dividends are close to each other it will be dicult for traders and for the subsequent
analysis of the data to dierentiate between these two states. In addition, convergence to a wrong price
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is reported by others, e.g. Sunder (1992), too. The aggregation over two periods is not a general problem
as our two sessions with only two states in period B and as Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1982) showed.
Misaligned beliefs are often caused by paralysis, plunging or scalping of some traders. A more complete
theory of traps might weave these decision rules and other features like supply constraints and the role
of H
B
-claim prices into a formal, dynamic story about how traps come about and are sustained. Such
a story would presumably tell us what treatment variables make traps more or less likely. There are
some models with a more detailed structure concerning the distribution of signals, timing of trading
and pricing rules to explain a specic kind of asset price movements. For example, a combination of
Romer's (1993) two models might oer such a formal, dynamic story and an explanation of rational
asset-price movements without news. However, these two models are still based on the assumption that
all traders behave always rationally. Gul and Lundholm (1995) provide another interesting model which
might explain indirectly what causes the evolution of misaligned beliefs and the resulting information
trap. Suppose that an overcondent trader uses his private information too early (relative to rational
behavior) or not as suggested by theory. The result is that all other traders update their beliefs correctly
but based on the wrong information set which leads to misaligned beliefs as in our third example. All
three models together with our experimental results provide some useful insights for further theoretical
and experimental research.
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Appendix
A. Instructions
General
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research foundations have
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make
good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash.
In this experiment we are going to conduct a market in which you will be a participant in a sequence
of market years. Each year consists of two periods, the rst of which will be called \Period A", and the
second \Period B". Each period lasts 7 minutes which will be announced at the beginning of each period.
The markets for certicates that have a one year (=two period) life. The certicates pay a dividend
A after the rst period and a liquidation dividend B at the end of the second period. Both dividends
depend on the mutually independent realized states in Period A and Period B. An attached
package of information and record sheets will help determine the value to you of any decisions you might
make. Your are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.
The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings will be in terms of francs.
Each franc is worth 0.002 dollars to you (i.e. 500 francs = 1 US$). Do not reveal this number to
anyone. At the end of the experiment your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will
be paid in dollars. Notice that the more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn.
Specic instructions
At the beginning of a year you will be given a number of certicates. The certicates will pay a dividend
at the end of each period (as will be explained below). Your prots come from two sources - from
collecting certicate dividends on all certicates you hold at the end of a period and from buying and
selling certicates. During each market year you are free to purchase or sell as many certicates as you
wish. For each certicate you hold at the end of a period you will be given a dividend depending on the
realized state. You will nd dividend values in a box at the top of your information and record sheet
each year. For example, suppose your box looked like the one below:
H A 8 0 0 0
L A 9 0 0 0
S t a t e D i v i d e n d
P e r i o d  A
H B 1 0 0 0 0
L B 1 2 0 0 0
S t a t e D i v i d e n d
P e r i o d  B M B 1 1 0 0 0
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For each certicate that you held at the end of Period A you would receive 8000 or 9000 depending upon
whether the state in Period A was H
A
or L
A
. In addition, for each certicate you held at the end of
Period B you would receive 10000, 11000 or 12000 depending upon whether the state in Period B was
H
B
, M
B
or L
B
.
Thus, you will start every odd period (Period A) with an initial endowment of 10 certicates. You may
sell these if you wish, you may hold them, or you may buy more. If you hold a certicate throughout
both periods, then you receive both dividends A and B. Notice therefore that for each certicate you are
given initially you can earn at least the sum of the two dividends (one for Period A and one for Period B)
by simply holding and not selling them. Your initial holding at the beginning of Period B is determined
by your nal holdings in Period A, i.e. your certicates and cash are carried over from Period A to Period
B.
At the end of a year you are free to keep all dividends plus your francs on hand minus 32000 francs.
These are your prots for the year.
Determination of States
The dividend you receive from the certicates you hold depends on the states of the two periods:
 In Period A the state can be either H
A
or L
A
.
 In Period B the state can either be H
B
, M
B
or L
B
.
The states are associated with corresponding dividends as given in your Record Sheet. The states of
both periods will be randomly and independently determined before each year begins. The state will be
made public after the corresponding period. The random numbers were picked from a random number
table, which can be inspected by anyone after the experiment.
Period A H
A
dividends and Period A L
A
dividends are equally likely (i.e. if you repeat this experiment
over and over again, about one half of the time a H
A
dividend would be paid and about one half of the
time a L
B
dividend would be paid.). In Period B state H
B
, state M
B
and state L
B
are all equally
likely (i.e. if you repeat this experiment over and over again, state H
B
would occur about one third of
the time, state M
B
would be realized about one third of the time and about one third of the time the
L
B
state would occur.).
Information about States
At the beginning of each year you pick a clue card out of a box. The clue card carries your private
information, and you are not to reveal this information to anyone. It will be of the form:
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P e r i o d  A  D i v i d e n d P e r i o d  B  D i v i d e n d
N O T
( i . e .  e i t h e r  _ _  o r  _ _  )
Suppose for example the Period A state is H
A
and the Period B state is H
B
. Then the following clue
cards will be in the box:
P e r i o d  A  D i v i d e n d P e r i o d  B  D i v i d e n d
N O T
( i . e .  e i t h e r  L B  o r  H B )
H A M B
P e r i o d  B  D i v i d e n d
N O T
( i . e .  e i t h e r  M B  o r  H B )
L B
One third of the people would draw the card on the left, one third would draw the card in the middle
and, one third would draw the card on the right.
Information and Record Sheet
At the end of each period the dividend will be announced. You should record your period's dividend
earnings. At the end of each trading year you must compute your total earnings. Since you have an
initial endowment of no francs you just have to ll in your nal (Period B) cash. Notice that you have
to ll in a negative nal cash if on net you are buying certicates. Finally you copy your Period A& B
Earnings on the Final Payout form. If you want to keep a personal transactions record during a period,
you might use the table on your record sheet.
Example
Consider again the example above. Suppose for example that you hold 5 certicates at the end of Period
A of year 1 (line (2)). If in Period A state H
A
is realized, your certicates will pay 8000 each (line (1))
and your total certicate dividends in Period A would be 5*8000 = 40000 (line (3)). Suppose now that
you hold 3 certicates at the end of Period B of year 1 (line (5)) and have a nal cash of -29000 (line
(8)). If in Period B state M
B
is realized, you will receive 11000 per certicate (line (4)) and your total
certicate dividends in Period B would be 3*12000 = 36000 (line (6)).
46
Now you add lines (3) and (6) and write the result in line (7) [here: 40000 + 36000 = 76000]. You obtain
your Period A&B Earnings by adding lines (7) and (8) [here:76000 + (-29000) = 47000].
Are there any questions?
B. Design Parameters
Table 7: Design: Bets
In this table all bet design parameters are displayed for each session. Payment at the California Institute of Technology was
in US$ and at Universitat Mannheim in DM. The next column shows the number of participants (# P). In both, Period
A and Period B participants could choose between a high and a low bet which dier on the positive and negative payment
depending on the correctness of subjects' individual dividend predictions. p

i
=
false
low
 false
high
(
correct
high
 false
high
)
 
(
correct
low
 false
low
)
is
the probability for which the prediction has the same expected value for both bets.
Period A Period B
Session Place # P high bet low bet p

i
high bet low bet p

i
correct false correct false correct false correct false p

i
9510281 C 12 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
9511041 C 12 0.50 -0.25 NA NA NA 0.50 -0.25 NA NA NA
9511091 C 15 0.60 -0.30 0.30 -0.10 0.40 0.40 -0.40 0.20 - 0.10 0.60
9511141 C 15 0.60 -0.30 0.30 -0.10 0.40 0.40 -0.40 0.20 - 0.10 0.60
9511161 C 15 0.60 -0.30 0.30 -0.10 0.40 0.40 -0.40 0.20 - 0.10 0.60
9511261 C 15 0.60 -0.30 0.30 -0.10 0.40 0.40 -0.40 0.20 - 0.10 0.60
9511271 C 15 0.60 -0.30 0.30 -0.10 0.40 0.40 -0.40 0.20 - 0.10 0.60
9511281 C 15 0.60 -0.30 0.30 -0.10 0.40 0.40 -0.40 0.20 - 0.10 0.60
9512111 M 10 0.50 -1.00 0.25 -0.25 0.75 0.50 -1.00 0.25 - 0.25 0.75
9512112 M 10 0.50 -1.00 0.25 -0.25 0.75 0.50 -1.00 0.25 - 0.25 0.75
9512121 M 12 0.60 -0.40 0.30 -0.10 0.50 0.40 -0.40 0.20 - 0.10 0.60
9512131 M 12 0.60 -0.40 0.30 -0.10 0.50 0.40 -0.40 0.20 - 0.10 0.60
9512141 M 12 0.60 -0.40 0.30 -0.10 0.50 0.40 -0.40 0.20 - 0.10 0.60
9512151 M 12 0.60 -0.40 0.30 -0.10 0.50 0.40 -0.40 0.20 - 0.10 0.60
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